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Looking Before You Leap
Key Questions That
Should Precede Starting
New Product
Development
by Graham A.N. Wright
Monica Brand
Zan Northrip
Monique Cohen
Michael McCord
Brigit Helms
Abstract: Successful microfinance institutions (MFIs) ultimately will
be those that are “market-driven.” A key element of being marketdriven is the development of client-responsive products. This paper
outlines some of the basic questions and issues that MFIs should
address prior to embarking on the product development process.
Effectively conducted, systematic product development will result in
products that are popular with clients and more cost-effective operations for MFIs. It will also contribute systematically to the long-term
sustainability of MFIs.

Introduction
The microfinance industry is one of the few remaining industries
in the world that are primarily product- rather than marketdriven. With the rising recognition of the costs associated with
high levels of dropouts and their implications for achieving
sustainability, there is a growing appreciation of the need to
deliver client-responsive products. Increasing levels of competition in many markets have also highlighted the importance of
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a market-driven approach to microfinance. There is little reason to doubt that the microfinance industry will follow the
trend of the commercial world toward a market-driven
approach and that microfinance institutions (MFIs) that do not
respond to the needs of their clients will eventually fail.
Many MFIs are looking at new product development as a
way to respond to their clients’ needs. However, they often do
not understand the complexity and cost of product development. This note suggests a few essential questions to ask prior
to initiating new product development:
• Motivation: “Are we starting product development to make
our MFI more client driven?”
• Commitment: “Are we setting about product development as
a systematic process based on defined objectives?”
• Capacity: “Can our MFI handle the strains and stresses of
introducing a new product?”
Graham Wright is Executive Director of MicroSave Africa in Kampala, Uganda and has
worked on training, systems design, research, and evaluation of both rural and urban
MicroFinance Institutions for nearly fifteen years. Email: graham@microsave-africa.com
Monica Brand is Senior Director of Research and Development for ACCION
International, where she manages initiatives in the areas of new product development,
market intelligence, and efficiency. Email: mbrand@his.com
Zan Northrip is a senior consultant in the Finance, Banking, and Enterprise Group of
Development Alternatives, Inc. He manages DAI's work on product development for
retail financial institutions and serves as an advisor to banks operating under DAI management contracts. Email: zan_northrip@dai.com.
Monique Cohen is the founder and President of the new NGO, Microfinance
Opportunities. She was responsible for the development and implementation of USAID's
AIMS project. Email: moniquec@MicrofinanceOpportunities.org
Michael J. McCord is a Senior Technical Advisor to MicroSave-Africa where he focuses on
the areas of new product development and microinsurance.
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• Cost Effectiveness and Profitability: “Do we fully understand
the cost structure of our products?”
• Simplicity: “Can we refine, repackage and relaunch existing
product(s) before we develop a new one?”
• Minimize Confusion, Complexity, and Cannibalisation:1 “Are
we falling into the product proliferation trap?”

Are we starting product development to make our MFI
more market driven?
MFIs profess many motivations to undertake product development, and it is essential that the board, management, and staff
involved in the process of product development clarify their
motivations. With increasing levels of competition within the
industry, many MFIs set about product development only to
find new clients or retain existing clients whose needs or expectations have changed. Other MFIs initiate product-development activities in response to high levels of dropout among
their clients. Still others develop new products to help leverage
existing infrastructure, improve efficiency and profitability, or
accommodate other institutional considerations. These are all
good, indeed compelling, reasons for considering starting the
process of product development.
Other less convincing reasons for initiating product development include getting access to the growing plethora of
“innovation funds” available from donors and responding to
the microfinance industry’s current interest in product development. Effective product development is driven by an MFI’s
desire to become client responsive and rarely by external factors. 2 MFIs that develop products for reasons other than a commitment to responding to the market and becoming demand
driven may well discover that they have entered into a more
complex and time/resource-consuming process than expected.
On the other hand, MFIs have to live with the products
they deliver, and the investment in developing client-responsive services may well be the most important and cost-effective
one they ever make.
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Are we setting about product development as a process?
As in the formal sector banking industry several decades ago,
the microfinance industry is largely characterized by top-down
or “bath-tub” product development. This model of product
development typically consists of a senior manager having
what appears to be a good idea in the bath and then instructing
all branches to offer the resulting new product as of a specified
date. Under this model, there is little or no market research,
inadequate costing/pricing of the new product, no attempt to
describe the product in clear, concise client-language, no pilottesting, and no attempt at a planned roll-out of the new product. The introduction of the new product is simply dictated
from above.
A top-down or bath-tub approach to product development
can have expensive consequences—as many MFIs that have
introduced products without following a systematic process
have discovered. From Latin America to Asia, from Africa to
Eastern Europe, MFIs have experienced significant and costly
problems as a result of rushing new products into the market
place without following a methodical set of procedures. These
problems have arisen in such diverse areas as
• Limited demand for the new product (in some extreme cases,
additional client drop-outs).
• Cannibalisation of existing products by the new one.
• Ineffective/inappropriate marketing of the new product.
• Set-up costs far in excess of those anticipated.
• Poor profitability of (or more specifically losses generated
by) the new product.
• Management information systems unable to monitor or
report on the new product.
• Poor product supervision by mid-level managers.
• Serious client problems when product alterations are made
to address lack of profitability.
• Staff inadequately trained to market and deliver the new
product.
• Distortion of staff incentives and thus their activities in the
field.
4
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Experience has repeatedly shown that investing small
amounts up front in a systematic process of product development can save large amounts or generate larger amounts of
business in the future. One step of the product development
process leads to and informs the next and provides a reality
check that insulates the MFI from subsequent problems. A
proper process also provides the MFI an opportunity to correct problems or respond to issues while they are limited by
the confines of each step.

What is the Process?
The product development process is a systematic, step-by-step
approach to developing new or refining existing products:
1. Evaluation and Preparation
1.1 Analyze the institutional capacity and “readiness” to
undertake product development.
1.2 Assemble the multidisciplinary product-deveopment
team, including “product champion.”
2. Market Research
2.1 Define the research objective or issue.
2.2 Extract and analyze secondary market data.
2.3 Analyze institution-based information, financial information/client results from consultative groups, feedback from frontline staff, competition analysis, etc.
2.4 Plan and undertake primary market research.
3. Concept/Prototype Design
3.1 Define initial product concept.
3.2 Map out operational logistics and processes (including
MIS and personnel functions).
3.3 Undertake cost analysis and revenue projections to
complete initial financial analysis of product.
3.4 Verify legal and regulatory compliance.
3.5 On the basis of the above, plus client feedback sessions,
refine the product concept into a product prototype in
clear, concise, client language.
Volume 4 Number 1
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3.6 Finalize the prototype for final quantitative prototype
testing or pilot testing according to the risk/cost nature
of the product.
4. Pilot Testing
4.1 Define objectives to be measured and monitored during
the pilot test, primarily based on financial projections.
4.2 Establish parameters of the pilot test through the pilottest protocol, including sample size, location, duration,
periodic evaluation dates, etc.
4.3 Prepare for pilot test, install and test systems, draft
procedures manuals, develop marketing materials, train
staff, etc.

Systematic Product Development Process
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4.4 Monitor and evaluate pilot-test results.
4.5 Complete recommendation letter that documents the
results of the pilot test, do comparison with projections, identify lessons learned, finalize systems/procedures manual, and the initial plans for the roll out.
5. Product Launch and Roll Out
5.1 Manage transfer of product prototype into mainstream
operations.
5.2 Define objectives to be measured and monitored during
roll-out based on financial projections.
5.3 Establish parameters of the roll out through the roll-out
protocol, including schedule, location, tracking, budget,
process.
5.4 Prepare for the roll out, install and test systems, finalize
procedures manual, develop marketing materials, train
staff, etc.
5.5 Monitor and evaluate roll-out process and results.

Can our MFI handle the strains and stresses of introducing a new product?
The process of product development consumes time and
money. It often highlights opportunities or needs to change
central elements of an MFI’s systems. MFIs should therefore
carefully consider before jumping into product development
the questions “Are we really ready?” “Do we have the
resources?” and “Are we really committed to this?” As a first
step to answering these questions, the MFI should conduct a
thorough institutional analysis.
Institutional Strategy
The institutional analysis should start with a review of the
MFI’s institutional strategy and the business plan to achieve it.
The MFI should have a business plan that both includes, and
specifically allocates funds for, product development. This
requirement will necessitate the preparation and integration of
the product development process into the cash-flow budget
prepared with a business plan to document clearly the
resources allocated to product development and the expected
Volume 4 Number 1
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returns. These business plan components set out the
institutional priority placed on product development as a controlled and integrated part of the MFI’s overall strategy.
Financial Viability
The MFI should also analyze its current and projected
financial viability, including capacity for managing liquidity,
insurance of full product costing of current products, and
attainment of self-sufficiency. A new product can seriously
affect financial viability and proper financial management, and
an MFI should manage and track these key performance areas
prior to embarking on any product development.
Organizational Structure and Philosophy
For effective product development, an MFI needs an organizational structure and philosophy that encompasses and
encourages both a customer service orientation and a culture of
innovation. This structure will require effective and efficient
internal communications at all levels. Good communication
allows the MFI to enforce conformity to standard procedures
in branches (through the development and use of procedures
manuals) with clear authority levels and successful delegation
by management. In addition, the MFI will need a management
culture of, and systems for, listening to its front-line staff with
a view to optimizing client service. Finally, the MFI’s board
must have the commitment to customer service and the will to
follow the product development process in a systematic and
structured manner.
Human Resources
The MFI will also need the human resources to conduct
product development in terms of the availability and experience of appropriate staff. Product development requires training of existing staff and therefore a strong training department
or other training options. Low staff turnover will make the
product development process easier and the process of testing
new or refined products more valuable and informative.
Finally, the MFI will need to dedicate high-quality management

8
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resources to the product-development team to oversee and
implement the process.
Marketing
An MFI serious about client-responsive product development will need to focus on marketing—to track progress of
existing products, formally assess competition on a regular
basis, and understand the MFI’s strengths and weaknesses relative to that competition. The MFI should also regularly track
the results of marketing efforts to assess their effectiveness.
Prior to initiating product development, the MFI should
ensure that it has some marketing capacity available. The MFI
should already possess skills in assessing client needs and satisfaction (including the institutional ability to perform qualitative research), tracking results of marketing and products, and
evaluating its position within the market. This capacity can be
in-house or (more rarely) can be contracted out to market
research companies.
Systems
The MFI should complete a thorough review of its existing
systems with a view to optimizing them in response to client
needs and organizational efficiency goals prior to entering into
product development. Current systems form the basis of new
product systems, and so they should be capable, user-friendly,
accurate, timely, and comprehensive in reporting and tracking.
These features pertain to both electronic and manual systems.
A process review of the systems assesses staff satisfaction with
current systems, and analyzes the ability of the systems to
deliver accurate, timely, comprehensive data to users. The system should encompass procedures for monitoring and auditing
financial controls, including external audits as well as a manual
or electronic system able to track financial and nonfinancial
data by product and branch.
Current systems will require the flexibility to accommodate new products. Given that new products will create additional work for existing systems, these should have significant
excess capacity available, or the MFI should plan to add this
Volume 4 Number 1
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additional capacity. Finally, it is important to note that in
many cases new products will not only require modifications
to the information systems but may also necessitate completely
different delivery systems.
In summary, an MFI should already do the following
before significant funds are expended on the new product
development process:
• Practice the level of tracking and management required of a
new product.
• Understand the capacity issues in all relevant departments,
• Have the will and full commitment of management and the
board behind the process.
• Possess or have available staff and systems that can manage,
implement, and develop the new product.
• Have the capacity to train all relevant staff.

Do we fully understand the cost structure of our
products?
In view of increasing professionalism of MFIs and the competition in the MFI market place, it is essential that MFIs understand exactly how much each part of their operations costs in
order to facilitate informed management decisions. Key decisions include how to increase profitability by cutting costs or
increasing income; how to assess product-level performance,
and if necessary modify the price of existing products; whether
to accept and implement new products; and how to price new
products.
Product costing on a simple allocation basis is a relatively
straightforward exercise that provides the MFI with a wealth
of information and activity-based costing, while more complex
activity-based costing provides additional information on how
and why costs are incurred. This information is of great value
to management teams committed to cost-efficient operations
and
• Determines the full costs of delivering products.
• Determines the profitability/contribution of the products,
including over time.
10
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• Assists making informed decisions about selection of products, including cost/benefit analysis.
• Promotes a high quality MIS.
• Facilitates development of cost/profit centres.
• Reveals hidden-costs.
• Instils cost-consciousness among product/service department
managers—enhances productivity.
• Facilitates the pricing of current/future products.
• Provides a basis for business planning and investment decisions (such as which product to market etc.).
• Can be used as a basis for variance analysis (budget v. actual
comparisons, and so forth).
• Provides important insights that help identify inefficient
procedures.
• Facilitates reengineering processes and procedures used to
deliver the MFI’s products.

Can we refine, repackage, and relaunch existing product(s) before we develop a new one?
Product refinement fine-tunes or adjusts existing products,
often with limited effect on the existing systems—for example,
by changing the interest rate or marketing strategies of an
existing product.
New product development is the process of developing a
brand-new product—for example, a housing loan or a contractual savings product. Prior to starting the process of new-product development, MFIs should give careful consideration to
options for refining, repackaging, or relaunching their existing
products. Product refinement is considerably less expensive,
time-consuming, and disruptive than new-product development. Market research often shows that MFIs simply need to
change the way their staff talk about or describe an existing
product to bring in new clients or retain those who might otherwise leave. This slight change is clearly one of the least disruptive forms of product refinement, since it requires only that
the MFI invest in retraining staff and developing appropriate
marketing materials. Similarly, refining smaller, client-sensitive
Volume 4 Number 1
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details of existing products can often yield significant results at
a relatively low cost.
Opportunities for product refinement can arise from both
the front- and back-office aspects of the existing product. For
example, increasing the efficiency of the back-office staff or
systems can have a significant effect on the demand for the
product and the retention of clients. For instance, increased
efficiency can result in faster loan disbursements in response to
loan applications or decreased interest rate or fees as a result of
cost reductions. Reengineering back-office systems is as much
of an innovation as developing a new product, a fact that
should be clearly communicated to those administering
donors’ innovation funds.
Upon completing the process of refining or repackaging an
existing product—whether in the front-office, the back-office,
or both—the MFI can relaunch the existing product. The
relaunch provides an important marketing opportunity
through which the MFI can demonstrate its demand-led
approach and its commitment to meeting the needs of its current and future clients.

Are we falling into the product proliferation trap?
Product proliferation is increasingly common among some
MFIs that try to tailor products to respond to individual market segments with specific needs. These MFIs can find themselves offering many slightly different loan products. A
multitude of products often results in
• Confusion among front-line staff and clients.
• Complex delivery systems.
• Complicated management-information systems.
• Cannibalisation among products.
MFIs Cannot Do Everything!
When evaluating the diverse needs of clients, the MFI should
recognize that it cannot design a product to respond to each
and every individual specific need. The MFI should group the
most common and prevalent needs and develop products in
12
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response to them. The following variables must be considered
when evaluating the most common needs among an MFI’s
clients:
• Time scale/duration/maturity of the product—short, medium
or long term.
• Nature of deposits/repayments—small regular, small irregular or single/few lump-sums.
• Liquidity—the ease of access to savings/speed of disbursement of loan.
• Access issues—branch proximity/opening hours and numbers of withdrawals/concurrent loans.
One product can be marketed in many different ways to
meet a variety of clients’ needs. The MFI can market the same
short-term emergency loan as an education loan to meet periodic school fees, a health loan to meet doctor’s fees and medication, or a loan to allow clients to take advantage of an
unexpected opportunity, to name but a few.

Conclusion
Product development is an essential activity for market-responsive MFIs. As clients and their needs change, so the market-driven, demand-led MFI must refine its existing products or
develop new ones. But product development is a complex,
resource-consuming activity that should not be entered into
lightly. This paper outlines some of the basic questions and
issues that MFIs should address prior to embarking on the
product-development process.
Recognizing all of the above, those MFIs committed to
being market leaders and to responding to their clients must
indeed conduct product development. Effectively conducted,
systematic product development will result in products that
are popular with clients (even in very competitive environments) and more cost-effective operations for MFIs. More
client-responsive products will reduce dropouts, attract
increasing numbers of new clients, and contribute substantially
to the long-term sustainability of the MFI.
Volume 4 Number 1
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Indeed, in the long run, those MFIs that do not embark on
a systematic product development process will suffer the fate
of all businesses that do not respond to their clients’ needs.

Annex
Selected Resources Available
Market research and product development have only recently
become “hot topics” in MicroFinance and so there are relatively few resources available. That said, because they are now
hot topics, the number of resources is growing. The best of
those currently available are listed on the following page.

Notes
1. Cannibalisation occurs when the introduction of a new product diverts
sales from a company’s existing products and when revenue is displaced rather
than created.
2. However some product development is appropriately spurred by external
factors, such as changes in the legal/regulatory environment.
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Volume 4 Number 1

Table 1:
Process Step

Resources Available

Overview of the
Product
Development
Cycle

Brand, Monica, New Product Development for Microfinance:
Evaluation and Preparation, Microenterprise Best Practices Project,
Technical Note # 1, DAI, Washington, 1998.
Brand, Monica, Product Development Cycle, Microenterprise Best
Practices Project, Technical Note # 2, DAI, Washington, D.C., 1998.
Brand, Monica, The MBP Guide to New Product Development,
ACCION International, 2000.
CGAP Training Course on Introduction to Product Development, CGAP,
Washington, 2000.
Wright, Graham A. N., Beyond Basic Credit and Savings: Designing
Flexible Financial Products for the Poor, in Micro-Finance Systems:
Designing Quality Financial Services for the Poor University Press Ltd,
Dhaka and Zed Books, London and New York, 2000.
Wright, Graham A. N., Market Research and Client Responsive Product
Development, MicroSave-Africa, 2001.

Market Research

MicroSave-Africa, Market Research for MicroFinance (A Training
Course), MicroSave-Africa, Nairobi, 2001.
Wright et al., Participatory Rapid Appraisal for MicroFinance,
MicroSave-Africa, 1999.
Wright, Graham A. N., Market Research for MicroFinance-Letting
Demand Drive Product Development, MicroSave-Africa, 2001.
SEEP Network, Learning from Clients: Assessment Tools for
MicroFinance Practitioners, USAID-AIMS, Washington, 2000.
Grant, Bill, Marketing in Microfinance Institutions: The State of the
Practice Microenterprise Best Practices Project, DAI, Washington D.C.,
1999.
Krueger, Richard, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied
Research, Sage Publications Inc., California, 1998.
Lee, Nanci, Client-Based Market Research: The Case of PRODEM,
Calmeadow, Toronto, 2000.
MicroSave-Africa, Market Research for MicroFinance (A Training
Course), MicroSave-Africa, Nairobi, 2001.
Rutherford Stuart, Raising the Curtain on the Microfinancial Services
Era, CGAP Focus Note, Washington, 2000.
MicroSave-Africa and Research International, Market Research for
MicroFinance (A Training Course), MicroSave-Africa, Nairobi, 2001.

Concept
Development

Refine to
Prototype
Costing and
Pricing

CGAP Costing and Pricing MFIs’ Products CGAP Toolkit (draft), 2001.
MicroSave-Africa and Aclaim, Toolkit for MFIs -Costing and Pricing
Financial Services, MicroSave-Africa, Kampala, 2000.
CGAP Setting Interest Rates on MicroFinance Loans CGAP Occasional
Paper, Washington, 1997.

Quantitative
Prototype Testing

MicroSave-Africa and Research International, Prototype Testing Using
Quantitative Techniques, MicroSave-Africa, Kampala, 1999.

Pilot-Testing

McCord Michael and MicroSave-Africa, Planning, Conducting and
Monitoring Pilot Tests for MFIs: Savings Products, MicroSave-Africa,
Nairobi, 2001.
McCord Michael and MicroSave-Africa, Planning, Conducting and
Monitoring Pilot Tests for MFIs: Loan Products, MicroSave-Africa,
Nairobi, 2001.
McCord Michael and MicroSave-Africa, Planning, Conducting and
Monitoring Pilot Tests for MFIs: MicroInsurance Products, MicroSaveAfrica, Nairobi, 2001.
McCord Michael and MicroSave-Africa, Planning, Conducting and
Monitoring Roll out for MFIs.
MicroSave-Africa: www.MicroSave-Africa.com
CGAP: www.cgap.org
MBP: www.mip.org
AIMS: www.mip/componen/aims.htm
Bank Akademie: www.international.bankakademie.de

Roll out
Useful websites
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Counting in Social
Capital When Easing
Agricultural Credit
Constraints
by Jarka Chloupkova
Christian Bjønskov
Abstract: International trade liberalization often implies increased
potentials for export production. In order to invest in increasing
capacity in agriculture, farmers need to have credit access. However,
farmers in Central Europe and East Africa, among other places, are
credit constrained, due to collateral reasons. A model illustrates the
additional producer gains from having access to credit; the gains are
composed of a price effect, an investment effect, and a social-capital
externality. The model and empirical findings suggest that improvements of agricultural credit can be achieved by relying on existing
social structures, such as farmers’ social capital. The paper concludes
that such externalities need to be addressed when designing optimal
agricultural credit institutions.

Introduction
Agriculture is an important issue in the upcoming World
Trade Organization (WTO) round. Some of the largest economic gains arise from reducing agricultural trade barriers. To
be able to extract these gains, countries will have to overcome
a number of constraints, of which the WTO identifies capacity
problems as the most severe (Moore, 2001). Inaccessibility of
credit is often a particularly important constraint when
enhancing or restructuring agricultural supply capacity to meet
opportunities created, for example, by trade and commercialization (see, for example, Mathijs & Swinnen, 1999). In an
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African context, the problem of credit is crucial. Nevertheless,
as Mosley (1999) points out, distinction must be made between
individual credit markets, such as urban versus agricultural
credit markets, which is also the case of the Central and
Eastern European countries (CEEC) (Chloupkova, 1996).
All around the world, there are numerous cases of discrimination against low-income farmers’ credit, based on the lack
of suitable collateral, the high transaction costs of rural lending, and the various government interventions in the market. 1
Therefore, substantial demand for agricultural credit remains
unmet, particularly in the low-income segment. The objective
of this paper is thus to conceptualize the importance of agricultural credit markets in seizing the full potential of increased
access to international markets. A simple model illustrates the
theoretical effects of credit constraints. As a consequence of
the endemic lack of relevant data for econometric analysis,
regional cases from Central Europe and East Africa explain and
document the effects derived from the model.
The paper is structured as follows: first, a model used for
analyzing the importance of credit access is presented, and agricultural credit markets in the two selected regions are
described. The next section addresses the potential of trade liberalization. The section following describes the gains from
trade liberalization with and without avoiding credit constraints. The last two sections suggest a design of agricultural
credit institutions and offer some tentative conclusions.

The Model
In an ideal situation, farmers would respond to new market
opportunities by increasing supply. Since farmers often operate at the limit of their supply capacity, they must invest in
Jarka Chloupkova, a Czech citizen, is currently finishing her PhD thesis at the Royal
Veterinary and Agricultural University (KVL) in Copenhagen. Email: jarka@kvl.dk
Christian Bjørnskov, a Danish citizen, is currently a PhD student at the The Aarhus
School of Business in Aaruhs, Denmark. Email: chbj@asb.dk
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order to seize these opportunities. The prerequisite for such
investments is the availability of financial capital from retained
farm-earnings or from having access to various sources of
credit. Yet low-income farmers are often unable to retain earnings, either because there are no saving facilities or because
earnings are not sufficiently high; thus they have to rely on
obtaining credit. However, farmers all over the world often
face credit constraints and are therefore unable to seize new
opportunities, and may even struggle to maintain the current
level of supply. In other words, having access to agricultural
credit is crucial in order to seize opportunities arising from
trade liberalization.
In the following illustrative analysis, the agricultural sector
faces a beneficial exogenous-demand shock in the form of new
market opportunities. This shock is indirectly depicted in
Figure 1 as the derived producer-price increase. For reasons of
simplicity, the analysis ignores any effects of the domestic

Figure 1: Producer gains from trade liberalization and access to credit
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market; thus the analysis assumes that production for foreign
and domestic markets respectively are completely separated.
Figure 1 depicts a situation in which the agricultural sector
initially produces the quantity q 0 and producers receive the
price p 0 = p f / (1+t), where pf is the price in the foreign market, t is the applied tariff level, and p 0 is the price received on
exports to the foreign market. Following a trade liberalization,
such as a removal (or reduction) of tariffs, the producer price
on internationally traded agricultural commodities increases to
p1 = p f. In other words, farmers in general receive higher
export prices following trade liberalization.
Area A in Figure 1 represents direct producer gains from
trade liberalization as a consequence of the higher prices
received on exports. The trade liberalization enables an export
expansion, which in turn allows the production to increase.
Note that the analysis implicitly assumes that the exporting
country is small, because the demand curve is flat. Area B represents the indirect gains from a production expansion leading
to a trade expansion. This can be achieved only by investing in
production capacity when farmers are operating at or near the
capacity limit, which is assumed in the following. These potential gains from investment thereby imply an increased demand
for credit. 2 Area C represents additional potential externalities,
e.g., positive spill-overs that can be achieved by certain institutional setups, discussed later in more detail. The total gain (A
+ B + C) is divided among producers, consumers and trade
agents. 3 Only the gains of producers are considered in the following.
Area A represents the gains from receiving higher producer
prices on exports to the foreign market. With access to credit,
the farmer is able to invest in increased capacity and thus
extract the full immediate gain of liberalization, ∆A and ∆B.
These gains are unambiguously positive.
The benefits arising from externalities, which are depicted
as a shift of the supply curve in Figure 1 generating area C, are
specifically connected to social capital. Social capital can been
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defined in a multitude of ways, the most popular of which
refers to “features of social organizations, such as trust, norms
and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by
facilitating co-ordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). In the
present context, the most prominent feature is social networks
that enable efficiency gains through resource-sharing.
These externalities may derive from learning spill-overs
associated with the credit-disbursement process, such as social
capital augmenting human capital. Such learning spill-overs
can arise when clients attend meetings at the credit institution
and interact while waiting, thereby improving their networks;
for example, learning spill-overs contribute to the social capital of farmers by enabling them to draw upon the human capital of one another. Enhanced social capital might lead to
improved knowledge or adoption of new methods creating a
productivity externality, which produces positive gains if and
only if the transaction costs are relatively small in comparison
to the productivity gains. Drawing on other forms of capital
through such social networks may create even more social capital and thus other positive externalities.
In summary, this model illustrates three effects—both
direct and indirect—of increased market access depicted in
Figure 1: ∆A, the immediate gain from producers receiving
higher prices on their exports; ∆B, the additional indirect gain
to be captured when farmers invest in an increased supply
capacity; and ∆C, a potential social-capital effect external to
the investment decision. These effects are discussed in the next
section.

Agricultural Credit in Central Europe
and Eastern Africa
The model described above illustrates the importance of wellfunctioning agricultural credit markets, but in transition countries, credit markets do not function well, and in some
developing countries, formal agricultural credit markets are
entirely missing.
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Agricultural Credit in Central Europe
Central Europe represents the transitional economies that are
front-runners for the EU enlargement. Agriculture under the
communist regimes was collectivized in most Central
European countries. Later, in the process of transition, most
collectivized farmland was restituted, although a substantial
part of this farmland has been leased back to the transformed
cooperative farms. Poland was an exception; it maintained private ownership of eighty percent of the land and farm assets,
thereby maintaining small and inefficient farms throughout
the communist period (European Commission, 1998). This
coexistence of relatively small private farms and large-scale
cooperative and state farms is typical of the dualistic character
of agriculture in all Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEEC).
The process of transition from centrally planned to market
economies, complemented by the removal of state subsidies,
led to lowered profitability. Furthermore, the process of transition made much of the existing agricultural capital and infrastructure unfit for the emerging agricultural structure,
necessitating additional investment in restructuring production. However, reformed credit institutions are often reluctant
to finance agricultural investments. This lack of investments
further lowers profitability thereby putting a “brake” on additional investments.
The lack of investment in agriculture is closely related to
the land market, which is not functioning well in the CEEC
(Swinnen et al., 2001). Since land prices are low (due to the
lowered profitability in agriculture), the demand for land is
limited, and thus banks are reluctant to accept land as a collateral (Lukas, 1999). In addition, some CEEC have introduced
measures that distort land markets. For example, Hungary,
like Russia, linked agricultural land purchase with the requirement of professional qualification and obligation of cultivation
(CIVITAS, 2001).

22

Volume 4 Number 1

Counting Social Capital

As a response to these problems, Central European countries have launched various measures to tackle the lack of
credit. For example, the Czech Republic has employed the
State Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry—SGFFF (in
Czech: Podpurny a garancni rolnicky a lesnicky fond)—to provide collateral guarantees and interest-rate subsidies through
various programs. Other CEEC have applied similar measures.
These programs have successfully treated symptoms, but
neglected the main source of the problem: land cannot be used
as collateral, and as demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
subsidies lead to credit-rationing problems. 4 These problems
must be solved in order to enable the much-needed
investments.

Agricultural credit in East Africa
The CEEC have relatively minor credit problems in comparison to the situation in developing countries. As Yaron &
Benjamin (1997, p. 40) document, the endemic failure of previous agricultural credit schemes in developing countries was
partly a consequence of “biased sectoral policies, excessive government intervention, and legal and regulatory barriers.” In
comparison to a number of other African countries, East
African semiformal rural financial markets are relatively developed, although they exemplify the problems typical of developing countries. East African financial markets are shallow, as
indicated by broad money (M2) being only twenty-five of
GDP—about half of the average for Central Europe—implying
that the general access to credit is restricted. 5 In addition, limited existing credit sources are usually allocated to urban purposes, which means that formal types of agricultural credit are
virtually nonexistent for at least three-fourths of the
population.
A number of high-profile microfinance organizations in
these countries provide both urban and rural financial services.
In addition, a few formal banks have entered the microfinancial markets, but East Africa is still far from having well-functioning agricultural credit markets. For example, only one
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semiformal organization in Uganda, FOCCAS, focuses
entirely on agricultural credit. In addition, the Centenary
Rural Development Bank (CRDB) serves the non-poor rural
population. Findings show that even microfinance schemes discriminate against farmers; for example 82 percent of the
Ugandan population works in agriculture, while only 46 of the
microfinance clients are farm-based, implying that even these
subsidized, high-profile microfinance schemes discriminate
against agriculture (Barnes et al., 1999). The average loan size
at the CRDB is 877 US$—about 80 percent of yearly GDP per
capita, indicating that the poor segment of the population,
which includes most farmers, is not served by the bank.
Moreover, nationwide, there is less than one bank branch per
120,000 inhabitants, implying that less than 20 percent of
microentrepreneurs, including the vast majority of farmers,
have access to credit (Jacobson, 1999).
In other East African countries, agricultural credit markets
are also thin. From a potential of 4 million Tanzanian informal
enterprises, of which a substantial part are based in agriculture,
semiformal credit institutions currently cover only about
40,000, or 1% of the prospective market (Hulme, 1999). The
coverage in Kenya is higher but unsatisfactory in relation to
the total demand, pointing to a large low-income agricultural
population without sufficient access to credit. This population
is excluded from the benefits of investing in farm production,
and, as the worldwide inventory by Paxton (1999) suggests,
low-income farmers in developing countries in general have
significant demands to be met. Currently, the effect of microfinance in Africa is limited, but the experiences from Southeast
Asia demonstrate its potential.

The Importance of Credit Markets
As the model illustrates, an agricultural sector receiving a positive exogenous demand shock, for example through an
increased market access provided for by various trade liberalizing agreements, will be able to react optimally, and thus benefit
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from the increased export opportunities, if efficient agricultural credit markets are in place. The model shows how the
effects leading to producer gains can be split into three components, which are treated separately below. Because the EU
market is important for both regions, it serves as an example of
the foreign market in the model (Ministry of Agriculture of
the Czech Republic, 2001).

Immediate Gains from Trade Liberalization
The EU enlargement and the Cotonou Agreement are examples of such potentially beneficial demand shocks. In the presence of ill-functioning credit markets, the good will of the
European Union’s trade agreements might not be exploited
optimally. The EU accession will allow Central Europe, as
well as the EU countries, to trade freely and thus benefit from
their comparative advantages, entailing an increased agricultural-export potential related to increases in producer prices.
For example, producer prices on Czech and Hungarian beef
exports, identified as important by O.E.C.D. (1995), will
increase by 20 to 25 percent. 6 Based on available data, a guesstimate of the ∆A gains (see Figure 1) in the beef sector are in the
vicinity of 600,000 US$ for the Czech Republic, and 4 to 5 million US$ for Hungary.
In the East African context, the “Everything but Arms”
initiative dramatically increases the access of Least Developed
Countries (LDC) to EU markets, thereby increasing the export
potentials of Uganda and Tanzania. The ∆A gains for the
Ugandan beef-production are in the vicinity of 100 000 US$,
following a fifty percent increase in producer prices. Similar to
the C.E.E.C. accession to the EU, extracting the full potential
of the E.B.A. initiative requires investments.
Gains from Investments
As shown in Figure 1, the potential investment effects, ∆B, can
only be captured by investing in production capacity or by
employing any excess capacity that farmers might possess at
present.7 Khandker & Faruqee (2001) provide a striking example
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of Pakistani agricultural credit markets. The study documents
the severe constraints in the Pakistani agricultural credit market. In 1985, only ten percent of rural households borrowed
from formal institutions, and a negligible share of the households borrowed from semiformal institutions. Nevertheless,
the study estimates that marginal returns to agricultural production are 69 percent Borrowing from the Agricultural
Development Bank of Pakistan hence translates into a six percent average marginal return to credit on agricultural income.
The results indicate that poor households benefit much more
than richer households.
A study sponsored by USAID estimates the impact of
Ugandan credit schemes, which demonstrate that the impact of
having access to credit can be significantly positive for lowincome clients, raising their income by as much as 50 percent
(Barnes et al., 1999). 8 Deininger & Olinto (2000) undertook a
similar quantitative study in Zambia. The conclusion of the
study suggests that apart from the quite substantial effects of
investing in production (livestock, fertilizer, etc.) comparable
to the study from Pakistan, there is an additional benefit of
having access to credit, corresponding to ∆C in the model.

Gains from externalities
The findings of Deininger & Olinto (2000) suggest that there
are significant externalities connected to credit access. All
other things being equal, these additional benefits work
“magic” on total factor productivity. The increased productivity is not explained by a standard economic investment framework and could perhaps be attributed to various psychological
and social effects. The “supervision” externality mentioned by
Deininger & Olinto (2000) can for example be attained
through an increased responsibility level and by signaling a
higher level of trustworthiness. Such signals and the knowledge of increased responsibility will be spread in communities
(the farmers’ social network) through a shared “social
language.”
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In other words, the externality probably works through
increasing social capital at the individual and the community
level, which is complementary to other forms of capital.

Figure 2. Externalities
Level of Extemality
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The beneficial effects of social capital can, for example, include
impacts of learning spill-overs (Kilpatrick & Falk, 1999),
increased capacity utilization—for example, from sharing
machinery—(Weijland, 1999), and improved common pool
resource management (Anderson et al., 2000).
Figure 2 shows these potential gains from social-capital
externalities, ∆C. The magnitude of these gains depends on the
design of credit institutions. In an entirely informal institutional framework (the act of borrowing from friends and family) credit depends on farmers’ social capital to the extent that
lenders must trust borrowers; in other words the social capital
relied upon consists of bonding social capital—trust in the network nucleus formed by families and close friends (Woolcock,
1999). Similarly, formal banks also seem to rely on and create
some social capital (Deininger & Olinto, 2000). However, this
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social capital is of a more institutional character, comprised
more of rules than norms. Because this capital is partially separated from clients’ networks, it should perhaps be denoted as
institutional capital.
The largest externalities probably arise in connection with
borrowing at semiformal institutions. These institutions,
depicted in the middle of the formality scale, usually rely on
forming groups with joint liability and responsibilities instead
of relying on formal rules. These groups receive access to
credit at the semiformal organization, which is thereafter disbursed among group members. Repayment thus depends on
trust and norms within the group, or in other words, the social
capital of the group (Bjørnskov, 2000).
In general, Grameen replications and village banks rely relatively more on social norms, whereas cooperative structures
rely more on formal rules. Both institutional structures rely on
and create bridging social capital, or trust and networks of
more distant friends and acquaintances. The externalities arising from semiformal institutions are therefore larger than in
either formal or informal institutions because they create relatively more social capital by expanding clients’ networks
(Larance, 1998).
The total magnitude of these externalities associated with
having social capital might be greater than the simple sum of
its various subcomponents, due to potential cross-effects
between single components that create a synergistic effect.
These effects lead to the additional producer gain depicted in
Figure 1 by area C. In other words the magnitude of these
externalities depends on the accumulation of social capital
attributable to farmers’ participation in the credit institutions.
As is evident in the mathematics of the model, it must not be
forgotten that even these positive benefits come with some
transaction costs, mainly the time spent outside productive
activity. Researchers have recently criticized many microfinance institutions for not being sufficiently aware of this problem. An awareness of the importance of minimizing
28

Volume 4 Number 1

Counting Social Capital

transaction costs is often seen as the key to the success of Latin
American programs (Bhatt & Tang, 1998). Therefore, at the
end of the day it must be considered where best to invest farmers’ time.

Suggestions for Institutional Design
The simple model and research findings point to the need for
tailoring the institutional design to its social and economic
environment. In many countries, agricultural profitability is
lowered due to constraints in the agricultural credit market.
These constraints call for improving the agricultural credit
institutions. By providing low-income farmers with sufficient
credit, efficient investment decisions can be taken, thus
increasing agricultural capacity and profitability. If farmers
gain sufficient access to credit, there will be no use for state
interventions, and in particular not for distortionary interest
rate subsidies that work only as “pain killers.” 9 Under the current circumstances, the use of collateral subsidies may be necessary during a transition period, because they function as a
“bandage on a wound” while the proper institutions are being
set up.
To solve the credit issue in developing countries like East
Africa, the formation and use of microfinance institutions
should be encouraged, providing access to both savings and
credit facilities. The institutions do not need to be semiformal,
but can be a part of an already existing formal bank structure:
a top-down approach. However, the success of the Kenyan
Rural Enterprise Programme has shown that microfinance can
also evolve into formal bank structures, illustrating the feasibility of bottom-up development in the financial sectors
(Charitoneko et al, 1998).
As Bjørnskov (2000) points out, governments and international development institutions should probably subsidize the
education and training components of these institutions, but
must avoid direct subsidy of the actual financial component of
the institutions. The financial component should focus on
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achieving financial sustainability in the medium to long term,
while minimizing transaction costs for both borrowers and
lenders in order to function without destabilizing political
intervention. 10 Research suggests that social capital can be accumulated from participation in both components, leading to a
virtuous circle of economic benefits thereby furthering additional access to credit (Grootaert, 2001). In addition, governments should take any additional benefits to this social capital
into account when supporting the institutional design.
Apart from improving the access to credit, the institutional
design in developing countries should focus more on socialcapital externalities than in Central European countries, where
other institutional means for education and the distribution of
learning are in place. For most countries in Central Europe,
the transaction costs of standard microfinance solutions are
probably too high, taking the current agricultural structures
and history into account, but possible solutions that build on
the insights gained from microfinance could be used. 11 In particular, a positive feature to be borrowed from microfinance is
the use of the existing social structures, including the social
capital of rural communities. For example, if a group of five
farmers join together in order to purchase a shared investment
item, and aim at obtaining credit with joint liability, these
lessons show that their success will depend both on the selfselection of members of the group (the members must trust
each other) and the legal provisions for joint-liability lending
operations. Farmers joining resources for buying machinery,
for example a harvester, can use their social capital both for
obtaining the needed credit and for sharing the harvester, as
well as perhaps obtaining additional information and learning
from each other.
Summarizing in terms of the model, the access to credit as
such enables farmers to extract gains ∆B. An optimal institutional design also takes at least some of the externality gains,
∆C, into account. The issue is relatively more important to
East Africa than to Central Europe, where formal educational
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and institutional structures are fairly developed, but the importance of accounting for such effects is a lesson to be learned
from microfinance in both regions. Although access to credit
in itself holds the promise of reducing poverty, the model and
evidence suggest that the reduction efforts could be magnified
by accounting for beneficial social-capital externalities.

Conclusions
Agricultural sectors must be able to invest in necessary changes
of production structures and capacity in order to reap the gains
from increased international market access. For these investment purposes, farmers need to have access to credit.
Nevertheless, access to credit is a real bottleneck in both
Central Europe and East Africa, as well as in a range of other
countries. Formal banks in these countries are usually reluctant to lend to low-income farmers, often because farmers’
assets are not accepted as sufficient collateral because markets
for such assets are thin. In addition, enforcing collateral rights
in developing countries is often impossible.
In Central Europe, various state programs are addressing
the symptoms by subsidizing interest rates and providing collateral guarantees, rather than addressing the causes. Although
at first sight successful, this approach only postpones a real
solution of the collateral issue. In addition, the experiences of
several developing countries show that simply subsidizing
interest rates for agricultural credit can be both expensive and
dangerous.
Based on a simple model and empirical findings, this paper
argues that the cause of the problem can be alleviated by tapping into existing social structures, for example by relying on
joint liability to supplement the traditional collateral. In an
East African context, this can be achieved by encouraging the
provision of traditional microfinance. Some of the lessons
learned from microfinance, such as farmers’ ability to share
collateral and responsibility, can be applied in Central Europe.
Employing social capital often creates additional social and
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economic benefits external to the original investment
decisions.
The increased capacity and profitability in the agricultural
sector derived from improved financial institutions can
provide direct benefits to rural areas by improving low-income
farmers’ welfare. These benefits may imply that such lowincome farmers do not leave rural areas to seek alternative
employment opportunities in overcrowded urban areas, and
may thereby be supporting a move towards a more sustainable
rural and social development.
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1. The first wave of microfinance proved that interventions often had
adverse effects (see Yaron & Benjamin, 1997). During the last decade, Russia
introduced a similar approach with similar consequences (Wegren, 1998). In
some CEEC, highly subsidized agricultural credit schemes have not solved the
issue of access to credit either (Swinnen et al., 2001).
2. In real life situations, it must not be forgotten that as farmers gain access
to new markets, their comparative advantages could change, implying that the
optimal production structure will shift as well. This one-sector model captures
only one aspect of the problem, irrespective of other influences coming from
within or outside of the sector, necessitating further investments.
3. The share of the total gains accruing to the trading agents depends on their
relative bargaining strength. The remaining gain is divided between producers
and consumers, with the consumer share increasing and producer share decreasing with the degree of competition.

In order to make informed guesses about the size of the effects, the model
can be formulated in mathematical terms. The model uses a profit function proxying because welfare consists of a production function (Cobb-Douglas for simplicity), a price and a repayment term:
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where p = producer price, ϑ = a technology coefficient, K = composite capital, L = labor, H = human capital, r = interest rate, w = wages, and ω (initially = 1) is the social capital term. To be able to capture the full gains, farmers
borrow the amount M, which is repaid over two periods. This yields the effects
In the ∆C effect, social capital augments human capital, making ω>1, which
tends to make the effect positive. This is countered by the negative effect of the
transaction cost t associated with creating and maintaining social capital.
4. For example the Czech SGFFF has an impressive 96.5% repayment rate
(in interview with SGFFF, October 2001). However, the underlying problem of
farmers’ high indebtedness has not been addressed (Swinnen et al., 2001).
5. Averages for both regions conceal the fact that the Czech Republic and
Kenya have better-developed financial markets (data based on WDI, 2001).
6. Calculations are based on data from UNCTAD (2001) and TARIQ (2001).
7. For the lack of estimates on product specific supply elasticities, ∆B cannot
be calculated with any accuracy. However, relying on estimates of the supply
elasticity of total agricultural sectors, Central European supply responses, and
hence ∆B gains, in general will be approximately three to five times larger than
East African responses (communication with Hans G. Jensen, SJFI, October
2001).
8. The study is, however, methodologically flawed, not correcting for selfselection and a range of other client characteristics, as Bjørnskov (2000) pointed
out. Results should therefore be interpreted with some caution.
9. For example, the Malawi Mudzi Fund had a sufficient loan recovery for
some year, but due to one instant of failed harvest, repayment rates dropped dramatically. They did not recover the following years, and the Fund therefore collapsed, demonstrating that simply subsidizing ordinary credit disbursement can
be harmful (Hulme & Mosley, 1996).
10. Examples from Russia and Senegal emphasize the adverse link between
party politics and decision-making in credit programs (Wegren, 1998; Warning &
Sadoulet, 1998).
11. Contrary to small and medium sized enterprises, for which microfinance
solutions seem to be working in Central Europe (the Funduz Mikro in Poland,
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for example), relatively high transaction costs and the dismal experience of
forced agricultural cooperation in the communist period in general makes standard group-loan solutions not apt in all but the poorest parts of Central and
Eastern Europe.
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Impact Assessment of
Microfinance
Interventions in Ghana
and South Africa
A Synthesis of Major
Impacts and Lessons
by Sam Afrane
Abstract: Delivery of microcredit to operators of small and micro
enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries is increasingly being
viewed as a strategic means of assisting the so-called “working poor”
(ILO, 1973). Over the past decade, a considerable amount of multi- and
bilateral aid has been channeled into microfinance programs in the
Third World with varying degrees of success. Like all development
interventions, donors, governments, and other interested parties
demand evaluations and impact assessment studies to ascertain the
achievements and failures of these programs. This paper reviews two
such studies conducted in Ghana and South Africa that focused mainly
on impact results. The outcomes of the two case studies have established that microfinance interventions have achieved significant
improvements in terms of increased business incomes, improved access
to life-enhancing facilities, and empowerment of people, particularly
women.

Introduction
Over the past two decades, various development approaches
have been devised by policymakers, international development
agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and others aimed at
poverty reduction in developing countries. One of these strategies, which has become increasingly popular since the early
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1990s, involves microfinance schemes, which provide financial
services in the form of savings and credit opportunities to the
working poor (Johnson & Rogaly, 1997). Small and microenterprises (SMEs) are the backbone of many economies in
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and hold the key to possible revival
of economic growth and the elimination of poverty on a sustainable basis. Despite the substantial role of the SMEs in
SSA’s economies, they are denied official support, particularly
credit, from institutionalized financial service organizations
that provide funds to businesses.
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) have become increasingly
involved in providing financial services to SMEs focused on
poverty reduction and the economic survival of the poorest of
the poor. There is continuing and quite rapid improvement in
understanding how financial services for the poor can best be
provided. As part of this learning process, microfinance practitioners, donors, and governments have been interested in
knowing to what extent these credit interventions impact the
beneficiaries. Consequently, a number of impact assessment
studies on the performance of microfinance projects have been
undertaken in recent years, with varying and revealing results.
Although there are various aspects of impact assessment
studies, this paper focuses primarily on the impact results and
emerging trends of microfinance projects conducted by the
author in Ghana and South Africa in 1997 and 1998, respectively. The first section explores conceptual and methodological issues of impact assessment in order to provide a theoretical
framework for the paper. The second section examines the
methodologies used in both studies, while the third section
analyzes the impact results of the two microfinance interventions in Africa, focusing on the measurement indicators and
the extent of transformation in the lives and businesses of the
project beneficiaries. Within the framework of the analyses,
Dr. Sam Afrane is a Senior lecturer in the Department of Planning of the University of
Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana. Email: samafrane@hotmail.com.
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the differing levels of impact in both projects are compared.
The fourth section ties together the key findings and conclusions of the studies.

Review of the Concept
and Techniques of Impact Assessment
Concept
Impact assessment is a management mechanism aimed at measuring the effects of projects on the intended beneficiaries. The
rationale is to ascertain whether the resources invested produce
the expected level of output and benefits as well as contribute
to the mission of the organization that makes the investments.
Indeed, for microfinance institutions (MFIs), impact assessment is important in enabling them to remain true to their
mission of “working with poor people in their struggle against
hunger, disease, exploitation and poverty” (Johnson & Rogaly,
1997). Until quite recently, impact assessment as a management
process has been mainly associated with and driven by donor
agencies. It is increasingly acknowledged, however, that donor
interventions have higher potential of sustainability and
growth if these processes are developed and managed with
greater involvement of the target group. The traditional
approach to impact assessment comprises reviews and examinations of effects by “neutral” outsiders who are more likely to
give unbiased and uninfluenced assessment. This method is
criticized as being monolithic in form and basically extractive
in process, and it fails to identify and respond to changing
needs and impacts of projects. In a positivist view, this
approach is supposed to be scientific, based on standardized
means of quantifying outcomes, reliability, and validity of
data.
Techniques for Impact Assessment
Debates over the techniques used for impact assessment have
centered on the application of quantitative or qualitative methods. Conventional approaches often give an unbalanced focus
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on quantitative and measurable indicators, to the neglect of
social and psychological issues that tend to be qualitative in
nature. Recent methodological research papers have revealed
that there are limitations to a purely quantitative approach as
well as to a purely qualitative approach in social science
research, be it impact evaluation, poverty assessment, and so
forth (Howe & Eisenhart, 1989; Glewwe, 1990; Dudwick,
1995). Each approach has an appropriate time and place, but in
most cases, both are required to address different aspects of a
problem and to answer questions that other approaches cannot
answer well or cannot answer at all (Car Valho & White,
1997). One significant innovation in impact assessment studies
of late is the injection of participatory approach into the broad
methodology. The participatory approach is a tool for learning
from experience. Its appeal lies in the fact that it is action
oriented and provides the framework for the stakeholders to be
intensively involved in data collection and analysis with the
process as facilitated by the researcher or resource person
(Howe & Eisenhart, 1989). For example, focus group discussions, often used in Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)
research, provide not only an effective means of collecting
high-quality qualitative data but also serve as a way to crosscheck or validate information from other sources (i.e., triangulation). In short, the participatory approach complements
conventional methods of data collection in impact assessment
studies. The application of these methods in impact assessment
studies is illustrated in the case studies presented in this paper.

Difficulties of Assessing Impact
The measurement of the impacts of microfinance projects is
obviously fraught with a number of methodological problems.
One such problem is the difficulty of estimating the counterfactual situation in order to compare with factual conditions of
the target group. It is encouraging to note, however, that in
recent years some progress has been made in developing
methodologies that address this problem. In fact, impact
assessment methodologies are being improved through the
40
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application of methods like “with” and “without” approach
and preproject baseline studies. The methods help not only in
assessing the counter factual situation but also in reducing
errors associated with memory difficulties of respondents
(Moser & Kalton, 1971).
Another problem is the difficulty of attributing any change
that is found in the circumstances of the beneficiaries specifically to the credit intervention. Normally, microfinance interventions take place alongside a whole array of social and
economic projects, all aimed at promoting development.
Consequently, other events and changes occur while the intervention is taking place, and this may make it virtually impossible to separate out the specific impact of credit programs
(Johnson & Rogaly, 1997). Here, too, the use of “control and
experiments groups” allows, at least to a limited extent, the isolation and capture of project benefits. The foregoing conceptual issues and methodological constraints serve as the context
within which the paper is situated. Some of these limitations
are addressed in the paper with appropriate assumptions.

General Background of MFIs Studied
As a prelude to the detailed discussions of the impact results,
this section examines the background information of the two
case studies from Ghana and South Africa. The first case study
involves Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) in Ghana. SAT is an implementing partner of Opportunity International (OI), an international NGO headquartered in Chicago, USA, and involved
in microenterprise financing in over 40 countries in the Third
World, Eastern Europe, and Russia. OI is therefore the major
sponsor of SAT’s credit operations. The mission of SAT is to
serve as the biblical “mustard seed,” through which opportunities for enterprise and income generation are provided to the
economically disadvantaged. In pursuit of this vision, credit
programs are designed to promote positive transformation in
the economic, social, spiritual, and political lives of beneficiaries and their communities. Its operations began in October,
1994, and it has since offered financial services to over ten
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thousand clients in all the ten regions in Ghana, supporting
SMEs in the trading, manufacturing, services, food industry,
and agricultural sectors. The lending facilities are extended to
individual clients and well-constituted, credit-seeking groups
called trust banks.
An impact study of the operations of SAT was undertaken
in 1997 as a contribution to International Transformation
Research being carried out by the OI Research Group. The
research sought to assess the nature and degree of changes that
clients have experienced in their businesses since they started
benefiting from the credit scheme, and to further examine the
extent to which these changes in their businesses have affected
other aspects of their lives.
The second case study is the Soweto Microenterprise
Development (SOMED) project—a microfinance program initiated in 1994 to provide credit and training to small and
microenterprises in South West Townships (Soweto) of
Johannesburg in South Africa. The program involved the provision of institutional development and lending capital for a
microenterprise credit scheme being undertaken by SEED
Foundation (formerly Izibuko Foundation), which was an
implementing partner of the OI. 1
SOMED was initiated by SEED Foundation with the support of the Australian Agency for International Development
(AusAID) and other donors to create sustainable jobs, to
increase levels of household income, to reduce poverty, and to
improve the standard of living as well as quality of life of the
poor in Soweto for a five-year period. At the end of the project
period, SOMED was expected to impact the lives of over
300,000 people, create 8,000 new jobs, sustain 8,000 existing
jobs, make 78,000 loans, inject more than $5 million into the
community, and facilitate the establishment of 6,920 new
enterprises; 4,156 of these would be started and owned by
women. A mid-term review was undertaken in 1998 to evaluate the impact of the SOMED Project so that the lessons
emerging from the review could inform the ongoing project
implementation process.
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Methods Applied in the Studies
A similar methodology was used for both studies. The methodology adopted for the two studies could be described as a flexible and eclectic research approach that combined relevant
aspects of quantitative, qualitative, and participatory methods
within the broad framework of changing evaluation and
impact assessment techniques. Whereas the quantitative
method dealt mainly with economic indicators (e.g., business
turnover, employment, etc.), the qualitative and participatory
methods examined social indicators and spiritual issues.
In terms of data collection, four main survey instruments
were used: questionnaire-interviews, case studies, focus group
discussions, and field observations. The questionnaire collected
both quantitative and qualitative data from the individual SME
operators who fell within the sample. In addition, case studies
were intended to assemble more detailed qualitative information from a few selected entrepreneurs who had unique impact
experiences. This method facilitated the capturing of interesting client stories and important impact statements. On the
other hand, the participatory approach used focus group discussions to examine divergent opinions about certain issues
and to validate contradictions in some of the information
emerging from the use of the other survey instruments.
Finally, the field observations offered opportunities for objective assessments of on-site situations of project beneficiaries
and also for further probing of issues that were initially
unclear. Data collection instruments were the same in both
studies except in the case of SAT, where focus group discussion
was not applied due to time limitations.
The selection of respondents for the questionnaire-interviews was guided by a sampling procedure. The process
involved (a) identification of the sample frame; (b) determination of appropriate sample size, and (c) distribution of the
selected sample size to ensure proper representativeness of the
client population. In determining the sample frame, the basic
criterion adopted was that the client should have been on the
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scheme for a minimum period that was necessary for clients to
have experienced some form of impact in their lives and business activities. The minimum periods fixed in determining the
sample frame for SAT and SOMED were twelve and eight
months respectively. In applying these thresholds, appropriate
sampling sizes were established for the two studies using a statistical sampling method. Based on these statistical analyses,
total sample sizes of 129 and 82 clients representing 92% and
90% confidence levels were determined for SAT and SOMED,
respectively. Following these, the proportional sampling
approach was applied in distributing the chosen sample to the
various categories of clients defined by gender, business sector,
size of enterprise, and level of education.
Four broad impact indicators, or domains, were defined
for both SAT and SOMED studies: economic domains, access
to life-enhancing facilities, and social and spiritual 2 domains.
Specific indicators were developed for each domain. The indicators were classified into quantitative and qualitative indicators, as presented in Table 1.
Ex-ante and ex-post analysis was adopted for the two
case studies. This was necessary to establish the extent of
change the credit interventions have had on clients since
they started benefiting from the programs. The main difficulty
encountered was how to empirically establish the counterfactual situation of project beneficiaries, since none of the programs was preceded by a baseline study, which would have
captured the conditions of clients before they joined the
scheme. In the light of this limitation, respondents compared
their conditions before they joined the scheme with their situations at the time of the survey. The assumption here was that
the respondents would be able to remember fairly accurately
these historical data concerning their situation before benefiting from the schemes. Obviously, by relying on memory of
clients, some inaccurate responses in some cases could not be
entirely avoided. Armed with this awareness, however, interviewers were trained and equipped to approach the interviews
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in such a manner that the problem of unreliability of data was
reasonably reduced. Apart from the lack of baseline data, the

Table 1. Impact Evaluation Indicators
INDICATORS QUANTITATIVE

QUALITATIVE

Economic

-

- Number of employees
- Increase in revenue or
turnover
- Equipment and tools
- Market opportunities
- Income and expenditure

Quality of business premises
Household/personal assets
Business diversification
Business skills and
techniques
- Business opportunities

Access to social - Water
services
- Toilet
- Health facility
- Children out of school
- Number of rooms occupied

-

Social

- Family bond and relations
- Quality time with the family
- Family acceptance and
respect
- Social involvements
- Public respect and
acceptance
- Attendance of social
meetings
- Financial independence of
women

Psychological

- Personal dignity and selfesteem
- Self-worth
- Confidence for the futureself-actualisation

Spiritual

- Church attendance
- Donation in church
- Participation in church
activities
- Prayer and devotional life
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Health conditions
Food and nutrition
Meeting educational needs
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studies adopted a “before and after” approach and not the
“with and without” methodology (i.e., control group) because
of the difficulties likely to be encountered in applying the
methodology. The use of a control group requires surveying
people who are not beneficiaries of the scheme and experiences
from similar studies indicate that the cooperation of such people could not be guaranteed. In view of the foregoing limitations, the results must therefore be interpreted within the
context of the general strengths and weaknesses of the “before
and after” methodology.

Impact Results
The studies analyzed the nature and degree of impact of the
two credit schemes and further examined the differential
effects of the program on factors like gender, business activities, access to social facilities, participation in community
activities, etc. The following discussions also compare the levels of impact in both projects and highlight the similarities and
differences in the results.

Qualitative Assessment
The first segment of assessment focused on qualitative indicators. This type of analysis dealt with the noneconomic dimension of project impacts that are often downplayed in
conventional impact evaluation studies. Qualitative impacts
measure social variables that are critical human development
indices and represent real improvement in the quality of life of
the poor. Since these variables are value laden and sometimes
perceptional, they are often difficult to capture.
For each of the qualitative indicators specified in Table 1,
respondents indicated whether their conditions with respect to
each of the defined indicators had either improved (positive
change), deteriorated (negative change), or remained the same
(no change) since they joined the scheme. Average impact levels of clients were established by defining thresholds for each

46

Volume 4 Number 1

17.6

12
12
7
5
9.0

13
0
38
9
15.0

5
6
4
4
4.8

2
2
1
2
2

SOMED

3.38

4
4
2
2
25

2
0
36
2
10

2
0
0
0
2

0
2
0
0
0.5

SAT

Negative Change %

Source: Field Surveys, 1977 (Ghana); 1998 (South Africa).

ALL SECTORS / DOMAINS

AVERAGE ALL IMPACT

Participation in Church Activities
Church Attendance
Prayer and Devotion
Giving
AVERAGE

SPIRITUAL DOMAIN

Family Relations
Public Respect and Acceptance
Time Pressure
Participation in Social Activities
AVERAGE

SOCIAL DOMAIN

Housing Conditions
Health Conditions
Food and Nutrition
Children s Education
AVERAGE

ACCESS TO FACILITIES

Business Opportunity
Market Opportunity
Quality of Business Premises
Household Assets
AVERAGE

ECONOMIC DOMAIN

Impact Indicators

36.6

54
47
41
44
46.5

50
35
30
28
35.8

24
52
31
23
32.8

43
24
38
35
35

SOMED

46.6

48
65
65
26
51

58
58
47
53
54

56
25
25
30
41.5

25
22
66
41
38.5

SAT

No Change %

56.0

34
42
53
51
45.0

37
65
32
63
49.3

71
42
66
73
63

55
73
61
62
63

SOMED

50.4

48
31
33
74
47.5

40
42
17
45
36

42
45
75
70
58.0

75
76
34
59
61

SAT

Positive Change

M

L
M
M
M
M

L
H
L
H
M

H
M
H
H
H

M
H
H
H
H

SOMED

M

M
L
L
H
M

M
M
L
M
L

M
M
H
H
M

H
H
L
M
H

SAT

Impact Levels

Table 2. QUALITATIVE IMPACT ASSESSMENT DATA

4TH

3RD

2ND

1ST

1ST

SAT

3RD

4TH

2ND

Rank
SOMED
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of the three outcomes indicated above. The thresholds were as
follows:
• Less than 40% of positive change: Low Impact.
• 41–60% of positive change: Moderate Impact.
• 61–100% of positive change: High Impact.
These classifications facilitated the ranking and comparison of
the various domains.
The data in Table 2 indicate that although the average
impact figures recorded for SAT’s clients were relatively lower
than those of their counterparts in SOMED, the ranking of the
first two main domains (i.e., economic and access to facilities)
was the same. Specifically, whereas SOMED’s clients experienced an average positive change of 56%, the clients of SAT
achieved a positive impact of 50%. On the other hand, the
clients of SAT experienced a relatively lower level of negative
impact of 3% as compared to 8% for SOMED’s clients. On the
whole, both projects achieved moderate levels of impact (i.e.,
41–60%) according to the assessment scale defined above.

Interpretaion of Averages
In terms of ranking, the results indicate that in both projects,
the economic domain had the highest positive rating, followed
closely by access to facilities. On the other hand, the social and
spiritual domains were inversely ranked between the two projects. That is, whereas social and spiritual ranked third and
fourth for SOMED, the opposite was the case for SAT. It is significant to note that the economic or business indicators
emerged as the domain with the highest impact. Three of the
defined indicators scored “high” impact with respect to
SOMED, as compared to two for SAT. Only two “moderate”
and one “low” impact scores were recorded for both projects.
This trend is not only expected but also very encouraging. One
female client of SOMED in the dressmaking business testified
that after receiving a loan of $500, she was able to increase her
procurement of sewing materials from $100 to $300 per month
and thus raise her gross turnover from $250 to about $1000.
Many other ladies in the sewing business shared similar experi48
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ences about how they were able to expand their markets as a
result of their enhanced ability to produce a wide variety of
dresses for sale, something hitherto impossible due to their
limited capital base. It was expected that these gains from
improved production and productivity would have snowball
effects on the other aspects of the lives of clients as discussed
below.
Following closely to the economic domain is access to social
facilities. The number of indicators with “high” impact scores
was very close to that of the economic domain. This implies
that a significant proportion of the increased incomes from the
businesses were channeled into improving access to lifeenhancing facilities comprising housing, education, food, and
health. It is important to note that the improvement in these
facilities represents real reduction in poverty of the clients concerned. One middle-aged lady in Soweto said that as a result of
the loan and the subsequent expansion in her business and
income, she and her husband have been able to send their children to a multiracial school. Another client said, “Our children can now have enough to eat at school, unlike before.
They are excited and indeed very proud of us as parents. We
can notice a huge difference in our relationship with the children. The loan has made all the difference,” she concluded.
Similarly, high levels of positive impacts were reported by the
clients of SAT for food and nutrition and children’s education.
The two important indicators recorded 75% and 70% positive
change, respectively.
With regard to social indicators, the data indicate that
SOMED clients achieved a relatively higher level of impact
than their counterparts in SAT. In terms of the assessment
scale, the impact levels achieved were more mixed. SOMED
scored two “high” and two “low” impacts while SAT achieved
three “moderate” and one “low” impact level for the indicators. SOMED and SAT recorded 49% and 36% average positive
impacts, respectively. Table 2 shows that, unlike the other
variables, no negative impact was experienced in respect of
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public respect and acceptance for both projects. Rather, positive
impacts of 65% and 42 % were reported for the clients of
SOMED and SAT, respectively. The majority of them saw the
financial support they received as a means that had enabled
them to gain public respect, acceptance, recognition, and an
enhanced involvement in the decision-making and development affairs of their communities. Most of them reported
improved self-confidence, leading to an enhanced ability to
participate in community discussions. Others have taken
responsible social positions and roles in their communities.
One female nursery operator in Soweto remarked, “Nowadays
I can attend community meetings with other women in confidence, knowing that I am respected by my neighbours and I
also have a say as a member of the community because I am
offering an important service in the society.” A retailer also
intimated that “I am now a member of the governing board of
the community school, which makes me feel proud that the
community accepts me.”
These positive impacts notwithstanding, some disturbing
negative effects were also observed in the social domain. This
refers particularly to pressure of time and family relations.
Business expansion resulting from access to credit obviously
meant more working hours and limited time for the family in
terms of quality interactions and other recreational needs.
Another reason was the nagging pressure on clients to avoid
loan default. Surprisingly, this indicator (i.e., pressure of time)
recorded the highest negative impact in both studies (i.e.,
SOMED—38%; SAT—36%) as well as the lowest positive
impact (SOMED—32%; SAT—17%). Further, the impact of the
projects on family relations was discouraging particularly in
South Africa as compared to the other indicators. Thirteen percent of SOMED’s clients reported negative change. While
some of the female respondents complained of the tendency of
some of the men to misuse resources when their financial situations improve, some of the males interviewed also expressed
concern about disrespect and lack of attention on the part of
some of the women. It is interesting to note that the adverse
50
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effects of enterprise expansion and economic growth on social
relations is in keeping with trends observed in the literature on
countries going through capitalist transformation (Mandel,
1978).
In spite of these unfavourable observations, some clients
indicated that they had had positive experiences in their families. One lady had this to say about the impact of the loan on
her relationship with her husband: “We have developed a special respect for each other because no one gives a burden to one
another when it comes to finances.” Also, a middle-aged male
client proudly remarked, “I can now provide leadership in the
house as a man because I have money to maintain and dignify
the family.”
In conclusion, although the projects have
achieved some degree of beneficial social impacts, the adverse
effects on pressure of time and family relations should be a matter of concern to MFIs, lest they undermine the overall positive benefits achieved.
With respect to the spiritual domain, 47.5% and 45% of the
respondents of SAT and SOMED, respectively, reported of
positive impact. As can be observed from the data, four of the
five indicators scored “moderate” levels of positive change with
respect to SOMED. On the other hand, SAT achieved one
“high,” two “moderate” and two “low” impact levels. The situation of a large proportion of the respondents (i.e., 46.5% for
SOMED and 51% for SAT) with respect to this domain
remained unchanged. It is significant that financial contributions to church activities improved significantly with the
respondents of SAT recording an impressive positive impact of
74%. This implies that some of the economic gains from the
loan scheme were being channeled to support Christian work.
However, three of the spiritual indicators scored “low” levels
of impact: church attendance,prayer and devotion activities, and
participation in church activities. This observation implies that
economic prosperity also tends to impact negatively people’s
attitude toward spiritual issues, as has been observed in many
rich countries. This observation is a real challenge to the work
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Table 3. Changes in Some Key
Quantitative Variables
INDICATORS

SAT (Ghana)

Monetary Variables

SOMED
(South Africa)

Amount $

%

Amount $

%

Average Turnover Increase

900

157

400

118

Turnover Increase: Male

317

122

318

72

Turnover Increase: Female

634

89

342

130

Increase in Value of Inputs

580

144

195

110

Increase in Value of Machinery

72

88

426

46

Actual
Increase

%

Actual
Increase

%

Increase in Employees

413

46

1500

49

Enterprises that hired new workers

43

33

36

44

Employment Change Variables

Source: Extracted from SAT and SOMED Studies, 1997, 1998

of Christian MFIs that are currently operating in many developing countries.

Quantitative Impacts
The quantitative assessment focused on changes in four important indicators: business turnover, monetary value of enterprise inputs or raw materials, monetary value of machinery,
and employment. Turnover here is gross monthly business
turnover, or what is generally regarded as monthly sales.
Turnover is used as a proxy for income and profit; most informal enterprise operators often do not distinguish between
these two variables. It is assumed here that gross sales or cash
flow from the business gives an approximate picture of business growth, at least in monetary terms. Although growth in
turnover may not have a corresponding increase in income or
profit, these variables often move in the same direction. Since
inputs and machinery can vary in terms of physical size and
quantity, monetary values were used to facilitate easy assessment of change. The ex-ante and ex-post approach adopted for
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qualitative assessment was also applied here as well. Whereas
some entrepreneurs gave verbal responses, a good proportion
provided information from their record books, especially
respondents from South Africa. The limitation here is that,
given the monetary nature of the above data, some inaccuracies
likely occurred since some respondents relied on their memory. The data gathered for the four indicators are tabulated in
Table 3.
The data show that the injection of capital into the enterprises had positive impacts on all the four selected indicators.
First, the turnover of the businesses of clients in both projects
increased significantly after the disbursement of the loans. On
the average, the turnover of clients of SAT ($900; 157%)
increased higher than that of their counterparts of SOMED
($400; 118%), both in monetary and percentage terms. It is also
interesting to note from the table that in both projects, the
enterprises operated by females achieved a higher turnover
than their male counterparts in monetary terms. This observation underscores not only the ability of women to utilize loans
effectively but also their capacity to manage businesses successfully when given the opportunity. Although the overall
picture of turnover performance looks generally impressive,
the situation was negative for some of the enterprises surveyed.
For example, additional data on the South African study
revealed that ten (i.e., 12%) out of the eighty-two sampled
enterprises recorded negative growth. The picture becomes
even more disturbing when one looks at the distribution of
these poorly performing businesses in terms of gender. In
terms of ownership gender, nine (90%) out of the ten distressed
enterprises were owned by women.
With respect to increases in the monetary value of inputs
and machinery, the level of increases in Ghana (144%; 88%)
was higher than in South Africa (110%; 46%) in percentage
terms. In monetary terms, however, the rate of increase for
inputs was higher in Ghana, while that of machinery was
higher in South Africa. The explanation for this observation is
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that a greater majority of clients of SOMED were using more
machinery and equipment in the operation of their businesses
than their counterparts in Ghana.
Finally, the studies established that 43% and 44% of the
enterprises sampled in Ghana and South Africa, respectively,
took on new workers. In addition, the total number of people
employed by the enterprises surveyed increased by 46% and
49%, respectively, for SAT and SOMED. About 20–25% of
these employees comprised unpaid family labor. This applied
particularly to the home-based enterprises. A related study in
Kumasi on home-based enterprises shows that the contributions of these family workers to the operation of the businesses
are integrated into the performance of domestic household
activities. For these types of families, no clear boundaries
could be drawn between the performance of normal household
chores and the running of the enterprises. This lifestyle continues from morning to the night, especially for households
operating retail services, food-processing, restaurants, and personal services (Afrane, 2000).

Key Findings and Conclusions
Both the quantitative and qualitative results of the two studies
have shown an improvement in the conditions of the clients
following the receipt of credit. Generally, manifestations of
positive changes were observed in almost all the impact indicators defined, namely, economic, social, access to facilities, and
spiritual. On average, a moderate level of impact was achieved
for both projects with ten and six indicators scoring “high”
impact levels for SOMED and SAT, respectively. In more specific terms, differing degrees of positive impacts were recorded
in each of the projects in the areas of business turnover, procurement of inputs/raw materials and machinery, creation of
additional jobs, acquisition of business skills, marketing outlets,
acquisition of domestic assets,increased access to quality food and
nutrition intake, water and sanitation facilities, and health services. For instance, turnover increased by 157% and 118% on
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the average for clients in SAT and SOMED, respectively.
These increases indicate that injections of small amounts of
capital into microenterprises are capable of raising the incomes
of the operators to appreciable levels within a relatively short
time. These findings and others from Bolivia, Uganda, and
Columbia (Eclof, 1999) amply show that microenterprise
financing is really one of the strategic means through which
the fight against poverty in developing countries could be won.
On the other hand, the impact results of the social and spiritual domains contained mixed positive and negative effects, as
compared with the other two domains. The positive impacts
included enhanced public respect and acceptance,self-esteem,participation in community activities, monetary contributions to
social projects, and empowerment of women. On the negative
side, pressure of time resulting from increased business activities, worsening family relations,poor church attendance, and participation in church activities were observed.
The evidence from these two studies indicates that
although microfinance programs have every potential to
improve the conditions of beneficiaries, they also tend to create disturbing negative impacts if necessary counteracting measures are not taken. The challenge, therefore, to MFIs is to be
mindful of these negative tendencies so that appropriate steps
can be taken to minimize these effects as much as possible in
the design of credit.
In addition, the results of the studies confirm that the
impact of the credit schemes on empowerment of women is
significant. The ability of the women to out-perform the men
in terms of business performance as measured by increases in
turnover also underscores the competence of women in enterprise development. The additional effects of the economic
gains by way of their enhanced ability to contribute to family
finances, reduced dependence on their husbands, improved
self-worth and confidence, increased social involvement in
community affairs, and so forth, justify the greater focus of
microfinance projects on women in many countries.
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Finally, a comparison of the impact situations in both
countries reveals that the impact trends and levels were not all
that different. However, both positive and negative impacts
observed in South Africa were more extreme than those of
Ghana. For instance, South Africa scored an overall positive
impact of 56% as compared with 50% in Ghana. On the negative side, the figures were 7.6% and 3.3% for South Africa and
Ghana, respectively. In addition, the level of negative impacts
with respect to the social and spiritual indicators was more
pronounced in South Africa than in Ghana. This trend may be
attributed to the different sociocultural and economic situations in both countries. In South Africa, where level of sophistication and inequalities are higher, more extreme impact
results are likely to occur than Ghana.
In conclusion, the two impact studies have established that
microfinance projects have impacted the businesses and lives of
the beneficiaries in several positive ways, particularly in their
economic circumstances and access to essential life-enhancing
facilities and services. On the other hand, some disturbing and
unintended effects have been observed in the social and spiritual dimensions of the lives of the clients. This implies that
although microfinance projects are expected to generate positive impacts, in some cases, such projects tend to have some
adverse effects, particularly on the social and spiritual lives of
beneficiaries. More research is therefore needed in the area of
impact assessments so that the outcomes can inform the designers of measures that will mitigate the negative effects of microfinance programs, maximize and deepen projects benefits, and
ensure effective means of measuring impact results.
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Notes
1. SEED Foundation is no longer a member of the OI Network.
2. The spiritual domain may appear strange to the general readership, but it
is of great importance to the two MFIs since their programs are driven by
Christian persuasion. The intention here is not to measure the impact of the
credit programs by “spirituality” per se, because that is a very complex issue that
is difficult to measure. The objective of the assessment in regard to this domain
was to measure the effects of the credit interventions on Christian (or religious)
“activities” of clients. The indicators to this effect are defined in Table 2.
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Special Symposium on
Microenterprise
Industry in the
United States
Introduction by Jason J. Friedman
This issue of the Journal of Microfinance includes a special symposium about the microenterprise development industry in the
United States.
The journal’s editors commissioned the
Association for Enterprise Opportunity (AEO), the U.S.
microenterprise industry’s trade association, to present four
articles that address the current status and challenges facing
practitioners.
The mission of AEO is to support the development of
strong and effective U.S. microenterprise programs to assist
underserved entrepreneurs start, stabilize, and expand businesses. AEO’s membership is open to all those who share in
its mission, and it has grown to include practitioners, advocates, public agencies, funders, and individuals. A fifteen member, culturally and geographically diverse board of directors
governs the association, assisted by substantial volunteer
participation.
AEO defines “microenterprise development” as the provision of support to businesses that generally require $35,000 or
less to start up or expand and that typically employ five or
fewer individuals. Coining the word “microentrepreneur” to
describe a particular kind of business owner, AEO helped
introduce this term to the U.S. lexicon, along with “microenterprise development.”

Journal of Microfinance

In support of its members, AEO provides the following
programs and services:
• Policy and Advocacy Program—AEO mobilizes members
and others to take effective action in support of microenterprise development nationally and locally. AEO’s policy and
advocacy efforts focus around federal programs that support
the needs of the microenterprise industry in the areas of: (1)
training and technical assistance and (2) access to markets,
credit, and asset development strategies.
• Training and Technical Assistance Program—AEO provides training and technical assistance in the design,
implementation and administration of microenterprise development programs. Training is offered through such venues as
the AEO Annual Conference and Membership Meeting, specialized group training, and individual technical assistance
and consultation.
• Research Program—AEO gathers and disseminates information on the microenterprise development field, including the
identification and development of best practices, program
innovation, and program evaluation efforts.
AEO also has several activities that promote networking
and information sharing among its members, including:
• AEO Exchange, a newsletter for members covering critical
information in the field of U.S. microenterprise;
• The Directory of US Microenterprise Programs, published in
collaboration with the Microenterprise Fund for Innovation,
Effectiveness, Learning, and Dissemination (FIELD);
• A website, www.microenterpriseworks.org, which provides
a comprehensive resource on the field with tools for practitioners and policy updates, among other things.
• A training and technical assistance listserv that facilitates the
Mr. Friedman has fifteen years experience in the development, implementation, and
management of economic and workforce development programs that focus on underserved populations and communities. For seven years, he served as Director of Economic
Development and Director of Marketing and Communications for the Institute for
Social and Economic Development (ISED), one of the largest microenterprise organizations in the U.S. During his tenure with ISED, the organization was awarded the 1998
Presidential Award for Excellence in Microenterprise Development.
Email: jfriedman@assoceo.org

60

Volume 4 Number 1

Introduction to the Special Symposium

exchange of ideas and best practices between microenterprise
practitioners.

Challenges Facing the U.S. Microenterprise Industry
After years of experience and research, it is clear that microenterprise development is an effective poverty alleviation strategy for a significant percentage of low-income individuals.
Most U.S. microenterprise programs, however, serve a relatively small number of clients on an annual basis. Thus in
order to realize the full potential of microenterprise development in the U.S., the field must develop strategies to increasing scale and sustainability. Other critical challenges facing the
field include:
• Reduced Government Funding—Smaller domestic budgets
and discretionary funding allotments at the federal level and
further changes in welfare and workforce programs threaten
existing funding sources.
• Competition—The field may be losing opportunities to gain
new clients. Alternative credit outlets and predatory lending
are fast expanding in low-income communities using sophisticated marketing techniques and internet strategies. At the
same time mainstream lenders are diversifying product offerings and using technology to streamline loan-making.
• Focus on Outcomes and Performance—Philanthropic organizations are moving toward more comprehensive community efforts and are evaluating investments in communities
measured by results, performance outcomes, and return on
investment.
• Sustainability—Microenterprise practitioners are spending
more time than ever raising money for their programs. Are
there more cost-effective and value-added strategies to raise
funds and generate non-governmental, market-driven income
streams?
In light of these challenges, AEO asked four leaders in the
field to share their insights, experience, and learning about the
challenges facing the field. Their articles are not only thoughtprovoking, but present some practical strategies to move the
field forward.
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Dr. John Else, founder and Chair of the Board of the
Institute for Social and Economic Development (ISED) and
founding member of AEO, addresses the issue of scale and sustainability head on. In his article, “Striving for Scale and
Sustainability in U.S. Microenterprise Development Programs,”
Dr. Else asks, “What are we learning about the barriers to
increasing scale and sustainability? What strategies are needed
to achieve growth?” Dr. Else identifies the strategies needed to
“grow” the field and identifies three areas of focus that are
essential to increased scale and sustainability.
Bill Burrus, President of ACCION USA, goes one step further and presents a fascinating case study of how ACCION
USA, the largest provider of microlending services in the U.S.,
responded to the challenge of increasing scale while at the same
time focusing on cost-containment and customer service. In
“Microenterprise Development in the U.S.: Closing the
Demand Gap,” Bill describes how ACCION USA conducted
extensive market research to quantify its market. It held focus
groups of current and potential customers across the United
States and re-engineered its image, products, and services to
meet the needs of its customers.
Elaine Edgcomb, Director of the Aspen Institute’s FIELD,
asks the critical question, “What makes for effective training
and technical assistance?” In her article, she reports on the
findings of FIELD-funded research projects implemented by
five microenterprise programs to assess the relationship
between training and client success at starting, stabilizing, or
expanding a business. Researchers looked at the process from
intake through post-training technical assistance, the skills
clients report using and how these skills link to business success, the measures of participation and compliance, and finally
the effect of training style on business outcomes.
Caroline Glackin, Executive Director of the First State
Loan Fund in Delaware, takes on the perspective of the potential microloan client, asserting that the full range of costs of
microborrowing are seriously underestimated. Caroline
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maintains that the typical design of microloan programs itself
creates potential barriers to access. Her article suggests a framework for the range of costs incurred by individual customers of
microloan programs in the United States and the barriers and
constraints to borrowing. She suggests that by understanding
these costs and barriers, practitioners can develop lower costs
and higher volume and impact models for the delivery of credit
and training.
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Striving for Scale and
Sustainability in
Microenterprise
Development Programs
by John F. Else
Abstract: A challenge to United States microenterprise development is
scale. After years of experience and learning, most programs still serve
relatively few clients on an annual basis. Given the barriers to increasing scale and sustainability, we need strategies to achieve growth. This
paper identifies strategies for growth in the field and identifies three
areas of focus that are essential to increased scale and sustainability.

Scale has been the primary theme of the last two Annual
Program Meetings of the Association for Enterprise
Opportunity (AEO), the microenterprise trade association—
and for good reason. While the field has grown in numbers
over the years—the newest (forthcoming) directory will show
contact information for 560 microenterprise development
(MED) programs 1—only a small portion of those programs
serve a substantial number of clients. Of the 560 MED programs listed in the new directory, 307 completed the questionnaire to provide data. Of the 307 programs reporting, only 41
percent (125 programs) served 100 or more clients during 2001.
Only 19 percent (58 programs) served 250 or more clients in
2001.
There have been many discussions about how to “grow”
the MED field. There are two strategies. One strategy is to
encourage additional agencies to add MED services to their mix
of services. Serious provision of MED services has tremendous
organizational implications for the agencies in which they are
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housed. Adding MED services to a social service agency is not
equivalent to adding another social service. Nor is adding MED
services to an employment and training agency equivalent to
adding training courses for new types of jobs or jobs in another
sector of the economy. The serious provision of MED services
requires not only hiring an entirely different kind of staff, but
also adding significant changes in the organizational culture
and in its organizational structures. Another strategy is to
encourage existing MED programs to grow in size, i.e., in the
number of people they serve. While both of these strategies are
important, this paper focuses on the issues involved in the latter—increasing the scale of existing MED programs.
Agencies with successful MED programs have hired staff
who understand and are oriented to entrepreneurship and who
run their programs in entrepreneurial ways. The agencies have
invested considerable time and resources to develop staff and
organizational capacities and build collaborative relationships
essential to the MED infrastructure. Though multiple sources
of services are often beneficial to people in the community,
given the costs of developing MED capacity, it may not be efficient or effective for multiple agencies in small population
areas to build that same capacity. Furthermore, whoever builds
the MED capacity should have a clear intent to make MED a
major initiative—an initiative to expand until it has the capacity to serve the population that needs the services. This
requires a serious strategic plan to reach a reasonable scale.
What are we learning about the barriers to increasing scale
and sustainability? What strategies are needed to achieve
growth? We have identified three areas of focus that are essential to increased scale and sustainability:
1. Management by results—a need to focus on outcomes and efficiency (cost/outcome).

John Else is founder and chair of the Institute for Social and Economic Development and
Director of ISED Consulting Services. Email: jelse@ised.org.
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2. Organizational culture, capacity, and structures that allow MED
to flourish.
3. Strategies that increase capacities and outcomes (both resource
development and strategies for increasing outcomes with existing
resources).

Managing for Results
Aiming for Outcomes: Mission, Goals, and Objectives
The foundation for managing for results is an outcomeoriented mission statement and outcome-oriented goals and
objectives. Though most organizations have strategic plans
and there is considerable discussion about mission, goals, and
objectives, confusion continues to prevail.
A mission statement needs to represent the vision of the
world (or community) that the organization seeks to achieve
or contribute to. It answers the “why” questions, for example,
“Why are we doing what we are doing? What impact do we
hope our work will have on the lives of the people we serve?”
While the diverse organizations that operate MED programs
have a wide range of missions, they usually focus on big-picture visions, such as the alleviation of poverty or the social and
economic well-being of communities or specific target groups,
such as women. Unfortunately, many mission statements simply describe what organizations do or the activities in which
they are engaged, rather than the large-scale context of their
efforts.
Similarly, goal and objective statements need to focus on
outcomes. For example, one outcome might be the number of
people whose businesses produce self-sufficiency levels of
income for their families. Too often, statements describe
“activities” or “inputs,” such as the number of training courses
held, or “outputs,” such as the number of people who complete
business plans or start businesses. Outputs are measures of
progress toward outcomes; they are not true outcomes.
Thus the first step in managing for results is to have clear,
outcome-oriented objectives that guide decision-making. As
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they think about and plan each set of activities, a program staff
is challenged to ask, “How does this relate to our mission,
goals, and objectives? Will these activities help us achieve our
mission, goals, and objectives? Are there alternative activities
that are more likely to move us toward our missions, goals,
and objectives?”

Escaping Common Tendencies
In short, having clear missions, goals, and objectives enables us
to operate with what might be called a “business orientation.”
This orientation helps us to escape at least three common
tendencies:
• The tendency to focus on inputs (number of classes held), outputs (clients served, businesses started), and efficiency based on
outputs (cost per client served or cost per business started),
rather than on outcomes (number of people earning self-sufficiency-level incomes) and efficiency based on outcomes (cost
per economically self-sufficient person).
• The tendency to focus on numbers rather than quality of outcomes. There is a tendency to count the number of businesses
started or served rather than the quality of businesses. Many
programs report as successes “marginal” businesses that add
little to the family income, or may even drain income from
the family. Many, perhaps most, programs do not make distinctions based on the quality of the businesses. Few organizations, for example, measure their performance or success
on the basis of whether the businesses result in families
achieving self-sufficiency-level incomes—either the business
by itself or when “patched” with other income sources.
• The tendency to focus on additional funding as the only way
to increase the scale. Some would call this a “non-profit organization-orientation” and contrast it with a “business orientation,” which would consider a full range of options for
increasing outcomes, including creative service strategies for
producing more with the same resources.
All three of these common tendencies must be overcome if
agencies are to manage for results.
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Focusing on the Customer
Many microenterprise programs resemble businesses that focus
so much on the products they “sell” that their businesses fail—
either because they do not realize that competitors are finding
less expensive ways to produce the same product (or achieve
the same outcomes for the customers), or because they have
not recognized changes in the composition or expectations of
their customers. Managing for results requires awareness of
customer needs and desires and flexibility to create products
that meet needs or modify existing products to meet the changing demand. For example, programs may require a number of
hours of training that exceed what clients find appropriate; or
the training may not be frequent enough or be offered at convenient times; or customers may believe that they would move
more quickly to their goal with a few hours of individual technical assistance rather than classroom training.
Managing for results also requires constant analysis of the
context in which the work is done. For example, if the goal is
businesses that provide self-sufficiency-level income, programs
must identify the barriers that inhibit program clients from
developing substantive businesses and must reshape their programs and products to respond to those barriers.
Focusing on Cost per Outcome
If MED programs are to operate like the businesses they advise,
they need to know the cost of their product—or the cost per
outcome—and they need to have costs that are reasonable so
that funders (another kind of customer) will think they are
worth “buying.” For example, if the objective of the program
is to create businesses that provide self-sufficiency-level
incomes or to create full-time jobs with living wages, then the
question is what does it cost to do that—what is the cost per
outcome? Some programs have this data, but many do not.
Also, programs tend to justify their costs per outcome by
pointing to all the apparent nonbusiness outcomes that occur:
increases in self-esteem, increases in the quality of wage
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employment that the participant subsequently obtains, and
even the recognition that self-employment is not the best
option. While these are important outcomes—and ones which
many have described as byproducts of MED programs—they
are not the outcomes for which most MED programs are
funded. They will continue to be important byproducts of
MED services, but focusing on quality outcomes and on costs
and outcome will challenge staff to think smarter and to be
continuously creative in strategies. Furthermore, the reality is
that it is not practical to increase scale at the cost-per-outcome
that many programs have. The best use of existing resources
and the ability to attract additional resources require finding
ways to reduce the cost per outcome.

Producing Reports for Program Management and
Promotion
Finally, managing for results requires systems that collect the
necessary data and produce regular reports on outcome and
efficiency. In this way, managers will make decisions that
move the programs toward their goals. The system must be
capable of producing reports regularly—for program managers,
agency administrators, funders, and policy makers. Program
managers need simple reports that provide information on the
progress toward goals and objectives and on the extent to
which performance is improving. Funders need reports that
help them determine whether to fund organizations making
application and whether funded programs are achieving the
goals and objectives they set forth in their applications. Policy
makers need information that helps them assess the potential
of MED programs and the costs per outcome in comparison
with other self-sufficiency strategies. The most important and
best quality information on the outcomes of MED programs is
not what is usually considered “program data,” i.e., the data
gathered at intake and at completion of the staff work. It is
follow-up data, i.e., the measurement of outcomes at intervals
after the customers are no longer receiving services, that provide a picture of how their businesses or business concepts
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have changed. MED programs that emphasize lending find it
easier to obtain such data because they often make multiple
loans and so have access to tax returns in subsequent years.

Cultural, Capacity, and Structural Issues
Organizational Culture
The culture of an organization is critical to the growth of
MED programs. A successful MED program requires an organization that is willing to take risks; is flexible enough to
reshape policies, program designs, and operations to benefit
the economic well-being of the people it serves; and is even
willing to struggle with mission issues.
Some basic questions reveal the organizational culture of
an agency. Does the organization understand what business
owners and nascent business owners need? Is it a “learning
organization” that constantly examines whether its products
and strategies are meeting the needs of its customers and that is
constantly testing new strategies in an effort to be more effective and efficient? Is it an organization that understands that
serious community economic development requires access to
credit—and aggressively seeks out resources to fill that need?
One test of the organizational culture and risk orientation
is decisions regarding the provision of credit to low-income
populations. For many social service organizations, this is such
new and uncharted territory that executives and boards of
directors are not willing to “make the leap.” In other cases, the
agency agrees to establish a loan fund, but the loan fund is so
restricted in size or in loan underwriting criteria that it fails to
have any significant impact in the community.
Flexibility is another test of organizational culture. As
noted above in the discussion of customer orientation, effective MED programs continually analyze their activities and
outcomes to assure that they are providing the services that
move customers quickly and effectively toward their goals.
Furthermore, creative organizations analyze the market to predict the potential market for MED services and to determine
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strategies that would enable the agency to serve a larger segment of that market. They are constantly learning and changing and testing to maximize the effectiveness of their work.
This analysis includes examination of optional strategies for
using the internal resources of the organization and the leveraging of potential additional resources that may be available in
the community, including the use of volunteers and mentors,
as well as potential linkages with other organizations.
Even the organizational mission is sometimes challenged as
MED programs grow. Some agencies have initiated MED programs and been excited by their growth in size, budget, and
importance within the agencies, only to discover that the
growth creates dissonance and discomfort. In some cases, the
dissonance is with the central mission of the agency. For example, some refugee service agencies have developed strong MED
capacities and then learned that the capacity is underutilized if
limited to the refugee communities (which represent only ten
percent of the immigrant population), or that the next step in
growth will require serving a larger population than the
refugee community. Similarly, community action agencies
develop capacities that are not available elsewhere in their
communities and are challenged to expand the population to
which the services are available beyond the target population
of community action agencies. In both cases, the agencies face
the dilemma of maintaining their mission (and thus limiting
the scope of the MED program) or changing their basic
mission.

Organizational Capacity
It takes time to develop the capacity for effective MED services. Many organizations start their programs using current
staff members who may not have experience or expertise in
microenterprise development. The agencies usually learn that
they need to recruit and hire staff with business development
expertise. Some agencies find that the salary scales they have
traditionally used are not adequate to attract business development specialists, who function in a different job market. 2
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Consequently, it often takes several years to have the appropriate staff.
MED programs must also establish relationships with various actors in their communities—other business development
and economic development organizations (e.g., SBDCs,
SCORE, and local and state economic development agencies),
SBA, banks and community development credit unions,
sectoral business associations, and state and business loan
funds. Again, employment and training programs and social
service programs may not have existing relationships with
these organizations—or may need to change the nature of those
relationships when it initiates a MED program. If the MED
program includes a loan fund, this often represents an entirely
new realm for the host organization.
In short, it requires considerable resources—and major
adjustments on the part of the host agency—to create a MED
program. It requires that the agency make an investment of
time and energy, but it also requires that the agency be willing
to make modifications to many aspects of its organization,
from its basic mission to its salary structure to its operational
procedures.

Organizational Structure
Structural issues are also common barriers to increase scale and
sustainability. MED programs are often nested in organizations with more general missions—Community Action
Agencies (CAAs), Community Development Corporations
(CDCs), employment and training agencies, refugee service
agencies, social service agencies, tribal governments, and
women’s economic development organizations. While MED
inclusion in agencies with broader purpose has been an asset to
the field—in terms of geographical coverage of the services—it
has also been a barrier to scale and sustainability.
One of the most common barriers to growth arises when
the MED program does not have priority within the organization and thus does not receive the necessary attention from the
agency leadership. Furthermore, developing the MED program
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may conflict with other aspects of the agency’s work. For
example, one MED program is partnered with a bank that does
not provide some of the expected benefits. Though it would be
in the self-interest of the MED program to change bank partners, that is not an option, since the bank has made a significant contribution to other initiatives of the agency. Another
MED program is nested in a tribal government. Though the
MED program could serve important functions for many in
the tribe, it is not high on the priorities of the tribal government—and like other tribes, the turnover in tribal council
members is so frequent that a sustained commitment is
unlikely.
Many agencies are not willing to provide the autonomy
that the enterprise and asset development activities may need.
One of the most common examples of structural barriers
relates to the MED program becoming a certified Community
Development Financial Institution (CDFI). Certification
requires that a majority of the staff and budget of the organization be devoted to financing activities. It is unlikely that
many of the kinds of organizations in which MED programs
are nested can meet that requirement. For example, since
community action agencies are often multimillion-dollar operations that implement a wide variety of large-budget programs—such as Head Start, energy assistance, food assistance,
and affordable housing—it is highly unlikely that financing
could ever represent a majority of its budget and activities. The
same is true for Community Development Corporations
(CDCs), which often have large housing development and
neighborhood business real estate development activities.
Yet these agencies often have greater organization infrastructure capacity than any other organization that serves the
communities they serve. In these situations, the only viable
strategy for the creation of a CDFI to serve the community is
to create a subsidiary corporation that focuses exclusively on
financial services. Two problems arise. First, such subsidiaries
are natural extensions of some organizations but not of others.
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Creating subsidiary corporations is common for CDCs that
may create separate corporations for each large housing and
business real estate development initiative—and creating a
financing entity may represent a natural extension to those
core activities. On the other hand, subsidiary corporations are
less common for social service and employment and training
agencies, and a financing subsidiary is a more alien concept.
Second, subsidiary corporations involve a perceived risk that is
difficult for some agencies, especially if financing has not been
a core activity.

Strategies to Increase Capacities and Outcomes
If agencies agree to manage for results, they will need to have
a clear analysis of where they want to go and how they will be
most successful in getting there. They will need a clear focus
and a set of priorities that will guide their actions. They will
need careful analysis and deliberate decision-making. This
paper discusses four of the many possible strategies: training
and technical assistance; lending; intermediary models of service delivery; and linkages with mainstream funding sources at
the state level.

Responsiveness and Efficiency in Training and Technical
Assistance
For MED programs nationwide, training has been a major
strategy. One reason for the training strategy is that it can
accommodate many people at once and thus reduce the cost per
participant. However, MED training has too often become an
end in itself. MED programs often offer “introduction to small
business” courses similar to those offered in community colleges, rather than presenting information as a means of developing a business plan for people who are ready to start or
expand businesses. “Graduation” ceremonies seem inappropriate;
they suggest that the accomplishment is the completion of the
course. In contrast, if the intended outcome is business starts
and expansions, it would seem more appropriate to have
Volume 4 Number 1

75

Journal of Microfinance

mobile, individualized graduations— inviting the entire class to
attend and celebrate each business opening or business expansion ceremony.
If the purpose of training is business plan development,
participants should understand that every training session is
taking them closer to completing the business plan, acquiring a
loan, and opening or expanding their businesses. Training must
be results focused. Rather than focus on what each participant
needs to move quickly to completion of a business plan, the
courses too often simply “cover” predetermined theoretical
material. In short, the educational strategy follows a classroom
coursework style, rather than a more adult pattern of learning
what is needed when it is needed.
Furthermore, serious questions remain about whether
training is in fact more “efficient” than individual technical
assistance. If only 25 percent of those who participate in training actually start or expand businesses, it is arguable that it
may be equally efficient to provide shorter training supplemented by one-on-one technical assistance to those who are
more likely to achieve outcomes. It may also be more efficient
to differentiate the various subgroups of program participants
and thus use the more intense strategies (individual technical
assistance) on those with higher probability of starting businesses. Less intense classroom training can be offered to subgroups where a lower percentage are likely to have such
outcomes.
Most important, the first step with new clients should be
an assessment that determines jointly how to move them
quickly and effectively toward their individual goals—and that
provides a menu of optional products to achieve that. Then a
plan should be developed that will achieve that end.

Increased Lending Capacity and Access
A high percentage of customers approach MED programs
because they are seeking business capital, and they perceive the
program as an avenue to business loans. The capacity to
enhance access to capital is critical to MED program success,
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whether by providing loans or creating access to loans from
other sources. With this goal in mind, some programs have
aggressively sought to generate resources for that purpose.
Increasingly, MED programs, even those that were historically
“training led,” have concluded that it is important to create an
internal lending capacity.
Lending creates access to credit for entrepreneurs who are
not served by banks and other traditional lending institutions.
However, some MED programs involved in lending create so
many barriers to borrowing—through requirements for training and technical assistance, sophisticated business plans, collateral, co-signers, and other underwriting criteria—that
customers lose interest and drop out before receiving loans.
While MED programs must be concerned about repayment,
they must also find creative ways to assess risk if the unbanked
are to be served.
Another issue is whether MED agencies and their funders
expect the lending component to be self-supporting. Unless the
lending volume is exceptionally high (and maybe not even
then), microenterprise lending, by itself, is unlikely to generate
sufficient revenue to support the lending activity. If agencies
expect the financing component to be self-supporting, they
will be pushed into broader lending activities, such as larger
business loans, housing development loans, and nonprofit facilities loans. While this is critical to the self-sufficiency of the
financing capacity and may be beneficial to the communities
the programs serve, it takes the organization in some new
directions. Agencies need to study these implications carefully
to determine whether this is the direction the agency wants to
pursue.

Intermediary Models of Service Delivery
Agencies are often concerned about providing services to geographical areas that have no access to MED services. One
option for achieving this at a reasonable cost is to use existing
organizations to deliver services to the expanded geographical
area while maintaining the lending capacity centrally. Since
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this strategy uses existing institutions, it minimizes costs,
while assuring quality control through centralized program
designs, policies, procedures, training, and monitoring. The
North Carolina Rural Economic Development Center represents one example of using this approach to serve a statewide
constituency, and there is much to be learned from that
experience.

Linkages with Mainstream Funding Sources at the State
Level
Many MED programs have established strong relationships
with state TANF (welfare) agencies and workforce development agencies to fund MED services to specific populations.
This places the MED program into “mainstream” funding
sources that have long funded other types of training services
for welfare recipients, unemployment insurance recipients, and
other unemployed people.
It is not easy to “break into” these systems. It often
requires a long period of time to convince administrators that
microenterprise (self-employment) should be one of the
employment options available to these groups. Each agency
has regulations that are often barriers to the self-employment
option. For example, many TANF agencies follow the “work
first” model, which requires that all recipients be employed
first and considers training supplemental; in these cases, MED
programs may need to negotiate an arrangement whereby
potential clients could be employed in related businesses—ones
that would teach them the intricacies of those businesses—
while they develop plans for starting their own firms. This is
only likely to be feasible, however, in businesses where the
employers do not perceive potential new businesses as serious
competition, and so they are not threatened by employing people who expect to start similar businesses.
Workforce development agencies also have barriers. The
performance standards that measure the relative “success” of
training programs is built on an employment model where the
standards are employment at or above a specific salary within
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ninety days of completion of training. Workforce agencies that
meet or exceed these standards are rewarded with additional
funding, while those that do not meet the standards receive
reduced funding. Even workforce agencies that would like to
provide the self-employment option are not willing to face the
negative consequences that come if a self-employment program
lowers its performance. There are ways, however, to circumvent the application of these performance standards to MED
programs, which are inappropriate measures of the success of
self-employment programs. For example, a certain percentage
of workforce development funding can be reserved for a governor’s discretionary fund, whereby programs are exempted
from the performance standards. The longer-term solution,
however, is for the workforce development system to create
separate performance standards for self-employment programs.

Conclusion
If helping people to become self-sufficient through selfemployment is our goal, then increasing the scale and sustainability of MED programs is an important means. Such change
requires a serious commitment of program staff, as well as the
top leadership of the agencies in which they are nested.
Increasing scale and sustainability requires willingness to take
a more outcome-oriented approach to the work and to consider expanding the current program. However, the agencies
and staff who are willing to make the commitment to growth
will experience great possibilities, both for the programs and
for the people they serve.

Notes
The observations and insights of several ISED staff and consultants—Dan
Krotz, Phil Black, Bonnie Dallinger, Karen Mocker, and George Bailey—contributed significantly to this paper. This ISED team is implementing an initiative, funded by SBA (Grant No. SBA HQ-01-Y-0136), to provide technical
assistance to 11 agencies that are committed to increasing the scale and sustainability of their microenterprise programs. Thanks also to the staff of the 11
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partner agencies that are participating in this project. They are committed to
struggling with the issues of scale and sustainability, and their insights have contributed to the learning of the ISED team and the MED field.
1. Conversation on April 29, 2002, with Britton Walker, editor of the forthcoming 2002 directory of microenterprise development programs in the United
States, a joint project of the Aspen Institute and the Association for Enterprise
Opportunity.
2. Some organizations have responded to this challenge by creating a separate salary schedule for their MED program that reflects the realities of the market from which they must recruit staff.
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Microenterprise
Development in the
United States
Closing the Gap1
by William Burrus
Abstract: To better understand the dynamics of the market and to
improve ACCION’s own capacity for delivering credit, the ACCION
USA Network (ACCION) hired a research firm to conduct a study
estimating the number of microentrepreneurs in the United States, the
number that had never received a bank loan for their business, and
qualitative information. The firm conducted twenty focus groups of
108 potential and current ACCION customers in New York, Chicago,
Houston, San Diego, Atlanta, and Miami. This paper reports the key
findings of these focus groups and describes some of the changes
ACCION has made in its programs to address the findings.

Introduction
In the mid-1980s, the first microenterprise development programs were established in the United States. Today, more than
a decade later, nearly 500 programs offer a range of services to
self-employed individuals including credit, training, technical
assistance, and networking opportunities.
During the “start-up” phase of the field, microenterprise
programs focused primarily on developing methodologies for
delivering services. Over time, different approaches emerged,
with some organizations specializing in credit and others concentrating on training and technical assistance. Through experience, practitioners learned that their target group was not
monolithic: program participants ranged from welfare-to-work
mothers to owners of well-established family businesses. Prior
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business experience, income and asset levels, educational background, ethnicity, and other characteristics varied greatly. The
one characteristic shared by all groups was a simple lack of
access to the conventional financial and educational resources
needed to start or grow a business.
Today, the field is increasingly committed to reaching
greater numbers of low- and moderate-income self-employed
individuals who lack access to the resources they need.
However, achieving scale is not easy. After more than a decade
of work, the approximately 500 microenterprise programs are
presently now providing services to, at best, several hundred
thousand businesses.
How much of a demand gap is there between the number
of microentrepreneurs being assisted and the overall number
who might need assistance? To help answer this question as it
relates to credit demand, the ACCION USA Network
(ACCION) 2 hired a research firm in 1999 to conduct a study
estimating the number of microentrepreneurs in the United
States and the number had never received a bank loan for their
business. 3 This research complemented and added to earlier
research that was conducted by ACCION New Mexico in
1997. The firm estimated that there were 13.1 million microentrepreneurs in the United States. Of these, 10.8 million had
never received a bank loan. Among this group, almost half
(45.7 percent) had never considered applying for a business
loan from a bank. Another 25 percent had thought about it but
considered themselves unlikely candidates for approval because
they were self-employed or because of the small size of their
business. About 13 percent had applied for a bank loan and had
been rejected. While the study did not inquire about the subjects’ needs for business training and technical assistance, one
can surmise that a large portion would express the need for
support in addition to credit.
Bill Burrus is the President and CEO of ACCION USA, a private, non-profit subsidiary
of ACCION International. Email: billwburrus@cs.com
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Given this significant market size, why is there such a huge
gap between the potential demand and the number of customers currently being served? To better understand the
dynamics of the market and to improve ACCION’s own
capacity for delivering credit, the firm also gathered qualitative
information. Over a two-and-a-half-year span, the research
firm conducted a total of 20 focus groups composed of 108
potential and current ACCION customers in New York,
Chicago, Houston, San Diego, Atlanta, and Miami.
This paper reports the key findings of these focus groups
and describes some of the changes ACCION has made in its
programs to address the findings. The paper concludes with
some yet-to-be-met challenges for ACCION and the microenterprise field in general.

Organization and Composition of the Focus Groups
The research firm secured participants for the groups using
standard recruiting techniques, including paying the individuals a sum (usually around $100) at the conclusion of each session. The participants were recruited by telephone and were
eligible to participate if they
• Were over 21 years of age.
• Were self-employed and had fewer than five employees.
• Had never received a bank loan for their business.
While the individuals were recruited “at random,” the firm
made specific efforts to recruit participants representing a good
mix of business types and both genders. Specific ethnic groups
were also recruited because ACCION was particularly interested in hearing from minorities that it was trying to reach. Of
the 108 individuals who participated, 86 represented a minority group. Approximately half the participants were women.
In each case the groups were led through a series of questions
by a professional facilitator, based on a discussion guide developed by the research firm and ACCION.
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Key Findings
ACCION staff and a professional from the research firm
observed each session. The sessions were also videotaped for
subsequent later viewing and reference. The discussion guides
used were designed to capture the information on a number of
topics, including the following:
• Sources of capital for start-up and funding of ongoing financing needs.
• Advantages and disadvantages of these sources of capital.
• Building credibility in the community as a microlender.
• Suggestions for an “ideal” lending organization.
• Awareness of ACCION and other lending or business support organizations among potential customers.

Sources of Capital for Business Start-Up and for
Ongoing Needs
The research confirmed what is well known to practitioners:
most microentrepreneurs do not see a bank as a viable option
to finance their business—neither in the start-up phase, nor as
their business matures. In fact, the researcher concluded that
this population often has negative feelings about banks. This
fact was true regardless of group composition. Of the entire
sample, about 16 percent had attempted to get a bank loan and
had been turned down. For most, banks were not considered a
potential source of capital. Why? Some had pre-conceived
notions that banks just wouldn’t lend to people or businesses
like theirs. For some it was a function of having no credit or
bad credit. Others were fearful of rejection, and a significant
number directly or indirectly cited prejudice against minorities
or the young age of the applicant. Finally, some felt that the
application process would be too complicated or intrusive.
Whatever the reason, the bottom line was almost always the
same. Bank loans are not an option:
• “Bank loans are for big, established businesses.”
• “Me go to a bank? It would be useless.”
• “They want so much information, it’s intimidating.”
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While the issue of prejudice or perceived prejudice against
minorities was more strongly expressed in some markets than
others—and more directly expressed by African-Americans
than Hispanics—it was a concern in the majority of markets.
Participants expressed their concerns in several ways:
• “There is discrimination against the belief that a black small
business will succeed. If you’re African-American and nicely
dressed, you must be a drug dealer. If you are poorly dressed
you must be a bum.”
• “It’s also because we’re Hispanics.”
If banks aren’t a real option for microentrepreneurs, where
did they get the capital to start up their businesses and to continue to operate? The participants cited four general sources
and discussed their advantages and disadvantages.
Many started up or operated with “savings.” This money
source should not be taken literally but referred rather to a
combination of cash savings, “day-job” income, cash-flow from
the business or reinvestment, or spouse’s income:
• “I started with a small camera and did a little bit at a time.”
• “We started little-by-little, in our backyard.”
• “My husband provided the money . . . from his salary. We
used the rent money and paid our rent late.”
Family and friends was the second common source of capital. This source was particularly popular among Hispanics.
While it appeared to be socially acceptable and common for
Hispanics, it was unacceptable for many of the AfricanAmerican and general-market participants:
• “You may ruin a friendship.”
• “Its awful. . .because of the guilt.”
Hispanics cited this source as a lifesaver:
• “My family would be insulted if I didn’t go to them for the
loan.”
• “I needed money for promotion. I didn’t get it from the
bank, so I borrowed from friends. My church—people who
are members—loaned me the money, interest-free and on a
payment schedule.”
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The use of credit cards varied greatly in the different markets and among the various groups. In some cases it was hard
to determine if and when credit cards were used for the business as opposed to personal needs. Using a credit card for personal needs also frees up cash for use in the business. In
general, the use of credit cards seemed more prevalent among
non-Hispanic participants, although not as popular as the
“friends and family category.” Hispanics were in general more
“debt-averse,” and as it related to credit cards, there seemed to
be a fear of the insidious nature of such borrowing.
The fourth source of capital for financing a business was
“other sources,” which generally referred to finance companies
and loan sharks. Neither was a prevalent source of capital but
was considered the source of last resort.
• “I used one once, and it broke my back.”
• “Yes, I’ve used [a loan shark], but it’s ten percent a week. I
was afraid of going to the bank: there is a lot of red tape, and
they make it so difficult.”
• “I got a loan from a finance company. The interest rate was
higher, but it was easier. They didn’t ask for any collateral.”

Sense of Business Insecurity among Microentrepreneurs
One clear theme that ran throughout the focus groups was the
insecurity participants expressed about their knowledge of
how to start-up or run their business. While the level of sophistication varied dramatically across the groups, almost everyone
felt that they needed help. Many expressed it in terms of wanting access to business courses, training, and general business
expertise:
• “You just don’t need money. You also want information.
Have experts in different fields and people who give information about their own businesses and how they’re doing.
Sometimes that’s more important than the money itself.”
• “[At start -up] I could have used help, advice with marketing
and promotion.”
• “You can see in the long run your business is going to work . . .
but you’ve got to know how to write a proposal [business
plan]. I didn’t know how to do it.”
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• “Small business owners need a bank tailor-made for us. We’re
not so sophisticated all of the time. We need help, for example, doing business proposals.”

Establishing Credibility with Microentrepreneurs
Participants were asked questions about how an organization
established to provide loans and other services to microentrepreneurs could establish credibility with them. There does
appear to be a fair amount of general skepticism that must be
overcome by any lender who is interested in serving this population. Several concepts were discussed in the focus group sessions related to the idea of credibility.
An important way to develope credibility is centered on
the concept and use of the word community. Participants
expressed a strong desire for an entity that would serve their
community. In this context, community sometimes referred to
a geographic area of a city but most often meant an ethnic
group such as the “Hispanic community.” It was clear from the
minority groups interviewed that they would more readily
respond to an organization offering services if they thought it
was established to serve their particular needs.
The groups were also asked to respond to the concept of a
“nonprofit” lending organization. The groups’ responses were
surprising and very mixed. A significant portion of respondents were unclear what the concept of “nonprofit” even
meant. In many cases the focus group facilitator had to explain
the purpose and concept of a “nonprofit” organization.
Perhaps even more interesting, once the concept was
explained, many quickly came to the conclusion that the organization did not need to “make money,” and therefore the
interest rate on loans should be at, or close to, zero. Only after
more explanation from the facilitator about the organization
“reinvesting the interest money earned back into the community” did the respondents begin to react positively to the idea.
Our assumption that being a nonprofit lender was a positive
aspect that should be emphasized proved incorrect. While the
concept is not negative, it is often not immediately understood
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and requires more explanation, particularly in the context of
lending and interest charged.
Perhaps the most obvious—but also the most important—
key to gaining credibility with microentrepreneurs is simply
creating a welcoming environment. We may underestimate the
level of insecurity, self-doubt, and defeatism that exists among
many of our potential customers, particularly when it relates
to applying for a business loan. Past negative experiences contribute to this attitude. If they were given the “runaround,”
were overwhelmed with the paperwork and requirements
involved, or have no credit history or a less than stellar history, they assume they will be unsuccessful in applying. In
other cases they may have never applied for a loan before, but
because of perceived prejudices or other factors, they assume
they will be turned down if they do apply. Thus many
microentrepreneurs approach the loan application process
with much trepidation. Most simply want someone to believe
in them.

Qualities Microentrepreneurs Would Look for in an
Organization Providing Loans
As part of the focus group interviews, the facilitator asked participants what they would look for in an “ideal loan company.”
While a number of ideas were presented, three seemed particularly valuable. First, it was clear that there is a wide range of
opinions about interest rates and a general lack of knowledge
about the subject. Almost instinctively, many automatically
want a “low interest rate.” Regardless of the organizational
form of the lender, some stated that acceptable rates should be
five percent or less:
• “A bank is good because they give you enough time to pay.
But the interest rate is high for a small business; they charge
five percent.”
• “The interest rate should be what the banks give for savings . . .
maybe two or four percent.”
• “If the interest rate is too high—like 12 percent—I might as
well just use a credit card.”
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Second, regarding the application process, most participants want the application to be simple and noninvasive with
“not too many requirements.” Most accept the idea that a loan
requires collateral or some form of assurance that the borrower
will repay the money. However, most assume that they have
no form of acceptable collateral. Most found the idea of finding a cosigner problematic and, for a few, it was even distasteful. While most understood the term collateral, they usually
interpreted it based on their knowledge or experience of what
a bank defines as acceptable collateral.
The discussion of loan amounts, products, and terms was
also revealing. Respondents asked for a wide range of loan
amounts, from as little as $500 to $100,000 and more. It
appeared that an upper range of $25,000 was reasonable for
most of the participants. However, it was also clear that there
is a market for loans ranging up to $50,000 for individuals who
did not qualify with a bank. Participants also asked for diverse
loan products including a line of credit and flexible terms,
including grace periods, graduated payment plans, and variable
interest rates, etc.
Finally, it is interesting to note that there was openness to
applying for a loan over the phone or via the Internet. This
willingness to consider remote applications was higher among
the general and the African-American participants. It was less
so among Hispanics, though this seemed to be changing over
the course of the two-year period when the focus groups were
conducted. In any case, while participants were open to applying via the phone and Internet, they quickly pointed out that
this approach should not replace the personal contact that for
them was essential.

Low Awareness of ACCION and other CDFIs
In all the markets studied, perhaps the most surprising finding
was that focus group participants were almost completely
unaware of community-based lenders in their area. In the cities
that did not yet have an ACCION program, participants were
given lists of other organizations identified beforehand as
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microlenders. Without exception, none of the participants had
received a loan from these organizations; and, perhaps even
more surprising, very few of the participants had even heard of
them. At best, a few had vague recollections of some of the
organizations.
In those communities where ACCION was operating (in
some cases for six or more years), participants were asked if
they had ever heard of ACCION. Again, few had ever heard of
us, even among certain groups such as Hispanics, on whom
ACCION had concentrated its outreach efforts.
ACCION had particular interest in gauging the reaction of
participants to its name, given that it is a Spanish word.
Hispanics were, not surprisingly, very comfortable with the
name, although the name itself does not describe what
the organization does. Non-Hispanics clearly struggled with
the name, beginning with how to pronounce it. A number of
respondents assumed that it would be an organization established to serve only Hispanics; others thought that it might be
an acronym.

ACCION’s Marketing Stategy
to Address the Findings
During the past two years, ACCION has been in the process
of reengineering its microenterprise assistance model towards
reaching greater scale, efficiency, and self-sufficiency. Some of
the changes being made are a direct result of the marketing
research and are briefly described below.

Establishing Trust and a Welcoming Environment
The research prompted ACCION to view microentrepreneurs
more deliberately as potential customers and gave us a greater
understanding of how better to serve their financial needs.
Given their insecurity and frequently held perception that
they will be unsuccessful in applying for a loan, ACCION
instituted several changes in the way we deal with microentrepreneurs. First, we have strengthened the customer–loan
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officer relationship to encourage trust and confidence in the
institution. Key to this process has been relieving the loan officers of many of the “back office” functions they traditionally
performed, such as loan document preparation, reference
checks, etc. This change gives the loan officers more time to
develop new business and to build an ongoing relationship of
trust with their current customers.
Second, to help bridge the gap between the banks and
microentrepreneurs, we have forged very rich relationships
with many banks across the country. Since almost universally,
the banks are eager to reach out to the community, partnering
with ACCION has been mutually beneficial.
Third, at some locations ACCION has shortened the loan
application or created a very short pre-application form,
intended to make the application process easier, to speed it
along, and to minimize the time spent by the microentrepreneur. This change also enables us to communicate a decision to
those who will not qualify for a loan early in the process, lessening their expectations and minimizing disappointment.
Fourth, ACCION has developed a greater appreciation for
the overall personal and business needs of microentrepreneurs.
While we continue to specialize in providing financial products, we are developing links and partnerships in the community that will serve to meet the other needs of our customers.
Paramount, of course, are their business training and technical
assistance needs. In all cities where ACCION operates, we
have developed formal partnerships with a select group of
organizations and institutions that can provide appropriate
business training and assistance to our customers:. These institutions include community colleges, other nonprofits, banks,
small business development centers (SBDCs), and others. Some
of the ACCION programs also have links with and make referrals to other community resources that may assist customers,
resources including chambers of commerce, mental health and
employee assistance programs, daycare provider associations,
trade associations, insurance providers, and others.
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Finally, we have increased our efforts to make our services
as accessible as possible, starting with the loan application
process. As part of our partnership arrangements, our loan
officers often work out of the offices of other community organizations and banks. We hold initial orientation meetings for
potential customers in various remote locations and at different times throughout our cities of operation. The purpose of
this decentralization is to reach out as much as possible to
potential borrowers, to be as accessible as possible, and to eliminate any physical, psychological, or time barriers they may
face in getting a loan.

Making Operational Changes
The research revealed that several aspects of ACCION’s operations could be improved to meet the financial needs of
microentrepreneurs more effectively. The most important
issue was interest rates. Our traditional model included one
interest rate for all of our term loans, regardless of size and
whether the loan was a new loan or a repeat loan. We have
now revamped the interest rate structure to account for the
loan size, perceived risk, and whether the loan is new or not.
Several ACCION programs offer a discounted rate to reward
customers who have demonstrated an excellent payback
record.
Also, relative to interest rates, we have developed and disseminated to our customers a brochure on financial literacy
that defines common terms and helps customers better understand the credit transaction. Our orientation sessions describe
the prevailing interest rates of banks, credit cards, and even
loan sharks and finance companies, putting our interest rate
and fees into perspective.
Third, we have diversified our loan products to more
appropriately fit the needs of the customer. The traditional
model involved a “stepped approach” with relatively fixed loan
amounts starting small ($1,000–$3,000) and then progressing
upward as the customer demonstrates capacity. Today,
ACCION takes a much more tailored approach to each loan,
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adjusting the amount to the real specific needs of the microentrepreneur. In some cities, we offer a line of credit as well as
balloon payment loans. These are most appropriate to contractors, who often do not get paid until the work is completed.
In addition, the research clearly demonstrated that we were
at risk of losing some customers because our initial loan
amounts and maximum loan amounts were too small. In
response to the market, we now offer initial loan amounts as
high as $15,000 and offer loans to reliable customers of as
much as $50,000. Of course, loan terms and rates are also
adjusted accordingly.
Finally, the research indicated that some microentrepreneurs were comfortable with applying for a loan over the telephone or on the Internet. ACCION recognizes that this “low
touch” method of working with potential clients is inconsistent with the field’s preference for personal assistance.
However, if the microenterprise field is to expand significantly, additional, less “high touch” methods for processing
loans must also be developed. Ultimately, potential customers
should have a variety of venues through which they can apply
for a loan. To test this hypothesis, ACCION New Mexico has
begun to take applications by telephone, including for new customers. To date, this experiment is proving very positive. Of
course, customers still meet personally with an ACCION representative to close the loan and sign all the necessary
documents.

Strengthening Our Image in the Community
The research that was specific to ACCION revealed that we
have a long way to go in terms of strengthening our image in
the community and among microentrepreneurs. We have made
several changes to address this challenge.
The research made clear that our name was a liability, at
least among non-Spanish speakers. While those Latinos participating in the focus groups reacted positively to the name, they
often suggested more descriptive language to identify what
ACCION does. We ultimately determined that the most
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practical course of action was not to change our name but to
add a tag-line that would capture and describe what we do. The
tag- line, “Lending, Supporting, Inspiring” captures not only
what we actually do—lend—but also the spirit we want to convey—supporting and inspiring. The feedback that we have
received from customers about the tagline has been quite positive.
The second action we have taken nationally is to consolidate and make more uniform our “brand.” Simple details like
using the same colors and formats consistently for the logo,
stationery, brochures, annual reports, and other public documents contribute significantly to creating “brand” awareness.
We developed a new descriptive brochure, designed specifically
to appeal to our customers, and chose a new stationery letterhead that is brighter and more colorful than the traditional
one.
Third, in response to the research, we have tried to become
more cognizant of how we describe ourselves to our perspective customers. As an alternative to the use of nonprofit organization as the way to identify ourselves, we now describe
ACCION as a “local, community organization.” The word
“community” evoked many positive responses from the focus
groups, and we have integrated it into our literature.

Creating Greater Awareness in Our Target Market
Perhaps the most obvious lesson from the focus groups is that
most potential customers are simply unaware that ACCION
and other microenterprise organizations are there to serve
them. While we have certainly been aware of the need to publicize our work, we have not fully appreciated the challenges in
reaching this market. Changing our approach has required a
shift at two levels: The first requires a change in orientation
and attitude. While continuing to value and adhere to our mission, we must learn to become customer-driven. This shift
poses a significant challenge because it requires making fundamental changes in organizational culture. It means thinking of
microentrepreneurs as “customers.” We must be prepared to
actively seek them out in ways that are appropriate to them.
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This shift in attitude, which is still occurring at ACCION,
must be translated to the second level of practical marketing
plans and budgets. Historically, ACCION has spent relatively
little on marketing and outreach. Since conducting the
research, we have significantly increased our marketing and
outreach budget. We have developed marketing plans and
strategies for each market and are in the process of developing
the tools that will enable us to better evaluate the results.
The research also demonstrated that effective outreach
efforts must be carried out at two levels: Media exposure and
advertising, whether free or paid for, is essential: newspaper
articles, radio talk shows, TV spots, bus and subway ads—all
can be important vehicles for spreading the word. In addition,
there is no substitute for grassroots outreach. While this type
of outreach is labor intensive, it is critical to developing local
credibility among the customer base. Connecting with local
organizations that will speak well of the organization and ultimately refer customers from their constituency is key.
Of course marketing and advertising are expensive,
whether through the media or at the grassroots level.
However, one has to ask the question: If the microenterprise
field wants to reach significantly greater numbers of people,
can we afford not to increase our marketing budgets dramatically? One way to help offset the cost of marketing is to find
corporate partners who may be willing to help underwrite
some or all of the costs. Examples of this approach include simple ideas, such as asking a bank to underwrite the cost of a
brochure or mounting a co-branding campaign with a company
in which it underwrites the effort and receives public recognition for doing so within a customer base or community that is
important to it.
Ultimately, of course, the best marketing strategy is to
build a reservoir of satisfied customers who will naturally refer
other microentrepreneurs. Being customer driven means that
we must always be willing to really listen to what people want
and change to meet that demand. The research that ACCION
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has conducted has convinced us that it must be a continual
process. Our decision to invest in this type of research has had
a profound impact on the entire ACCION USA Network.

Challenges for the Future
The microenterprise field in the United States is only recently
waking up to the fact that reaching much greater numbers of
the low and moderate-income self-employed will depend on
dramatically increasing marketing and outreach efforts. To
scale up through successful marketing efforts, we need to recognize and meet several important challenges.
The first is that the field must be willing to invest substantially greater amounts of human and financial resources in marketing, beginning with research. One reason that practitioners
are reluctant to invest resources is that public and private
donors historically have been unwilling to provide grants for
this activity. Resources for marketing and marketing research
are considered by some donors to be “overhead,” rather than
activities that are directly service or customer oriented. This
fact suggests that the practitioners in the field need to make a
better case to donors as to why marketing and outreach are so
necessary.
The second challenge facing organizations such as
ACCION is to convert market research findings into actions.
While it may seem obvious that market research should reveal
ways to improve our services, actually making those changes is
often quite difficult. As staff, management, boards of directors,
and stakeholders become invested in a particular approach or
methodology, they often resist change, particularly if the
change suggested is significant. The successful conversion of
market research findings into products and services requires
that the culture of the organization support change.
We must also be prepared to embrace the fact that the
microenterprise marketplace is not static and is affected by
many factors, including at the macro level. For example, in the
past five years, banks and other formal lending institutions
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have dramatically changed their small-business lending policies
and practices. Through credit scoring, they have been able to
reach down the economic ladder. Consumer credit cards have
also flooded the market, often with very low introductory
rates.
Even the characteristics of prospective customers change
over time. For example, the welfare-to-work legislation
enacted in 1998 meant that many individuals, most of whom
were women, began considering self-employment as an option
for the first time. Their needs, characteristics, and readiness to
be self-employed all greatly affect how programs are designed
to assist them. National immigration policies (and the realities
of illegal immigration) may mean that ethnicity, language,
trust in financial institutions, and past use of and attitudes
towards credit of these new customers may be radically different. Will the field be able to rapidly adjust to these changing
conditions and needs of the microentrepreneur?
The final challenge we face is to stay true to our mission
while meeting customer demand. This subtle—but important—
challenge has two aspects. First, as the field attempts to scale
up and reach larger numbers of borrowers, will we experience
“mission drift”? That is, will the profile of our borrowers
change to a more stable, “upscale” individual? Second, will we
be able to separate our mission from our methodology? Often
organizations often blend the two and become static and out of
sync with the very market they seek to serve.
Our ability to overcome these four challenges will determine whether the microenterprise development field’s ability
to become a truly significant national player will truly have
national impact.
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Notes
1. Much of the material for this paper was drawn from various market
research reports commissioned by ACCION, and from Abbe, Burrus, and
Yatskowitz (2001).
2. The ACCION USA Network is composed of ACCION New York,
ACCION Chicago, ACCION Texas, ACCION New Mexico, ACCION San
Diego, and ACCION USA.
3. For the purposes of the study, “microbusiness” was defined as having five
or fewer employees.
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What Makes for
Effective
Microenterprise
Training?
by Elaine L. Edgcomb
Âbstract: Only a few studies so far have focused on the relationship
between effective training and technical assistance, and client success
at starting, stabilizing, or expanding a business. The Aspen Institute’s
Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness, Learning, and
Dissemination (FIELD) project selected five U.S. microenterprise
organizations to increase the industry’s understanding of what makes
for effective training and technical assistance. What follows is a summary of key findings in two categories: those that address the relationship between the characteristics of clients and their business
success, and those that address the relationship of business skills training and client success.

Overview and Summary
When FIELD, the Microenterprise Fund for Innovation,
Effectiveness, Learning, and Dissemination, 1 was launched in
1998 at the Aspen Institute, one of the first challenges it set for
itself—and for the implementing organizations that responded
to its Request for Applications—was to answer the question,
what makes for effective training and technical assistance?
While these services have far and away been the dominant ones
offered to clients in the U.S., few have studied their relationship to client success at starting, stabilizing, or expanding a
business. Programs expend notable portions of their budgets
delivering these services, largely on a subsidized basis, to
clients who invest considerable time in them. Policymakers
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and funders support them but seek greater assurance that these
services are effective, and that best practices are implemented.
But training and technical assistance are services that defy easy
measurement and assessment. Unlike credit services, there are
no universally accepted measures of effectiveness, nor instant
feedback through the bottom line to help programs chart their
course. In this context, FIELD selected five grantees to
increase the industry’s understanding of what makes for effective training and technical assistance, and to answer three
important supporting questions:
• What are appropriate indicators of the effectiveness of training and technical assistance interventions directed to lowincome clients and their businesses?
• Which intermediate measures are better indicators of final
impact on clients and their businesses?
• What practical approaches can programs use to document
and track outcomes of training and technical assistance services on low-income clients, and how can that information
be used to improve program strategy?
Over the course of two years, the five FIELD grantees—
Central Vermont Community Action Council, Inc. (CVCAC),
Detroit Entrepreneurship Institute (DEI), the Institute for
Social and Economic Development (ISED), Women’s Housing
and Economic Development Corporation (WHEDCO), and
Women’s Initiative for Self-Employment—implemented
research projects to answer these questions. They examined the
process from intake through post-training technical assistance;
they looked at the skills clients report using and how these
skills link to business success; they researched the companies’
measures of participation and compliance; and they discussed
ELAINE L. EDGCOMB is director of The Aspen Institute’s Microenterprise Fund for
Innovation, Effectiveness, Learning and Dissemination (FIELD), a program advancing U.S. microenterprise practice through grantmaking, research, documentation, and
dissemination. Previously, she served as founding Executive Director of the Small
Enterprise Education and Promotion (SEEP) Network, representing forty North
American organizations engaged in international microenterprise.
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the effect of training style on business outcomes. The research
included a large quantitative study of 478 clients through statistical tests to gauge significance and an in-depth anthropological qualitative study of a sample of 20. The others used mixed
methods on varied sample sizes ranging from 25 to 91. Three
of the studies tracked clients for at least 18 months; one surveyed numerous clients at eight months after training completion, while another tracked a small group up to six months
out.
Each study had its strengths and limitations, and no one
can be considered definitive. Nevertheless, their findings gain
credibility due to their repetition across different study sites
and designs, and by the informed reflection of experienced staff
on their results. Each institution’s own training and consulting
staff participated in the analysis of findings at the program
level; and grantee representatives responsible for their organization’s research participated in a joint reflection on the meaning and importance of findings emerging across all five sites.
What follows is a summary of key findings in two categories: those that address the relationship between the characteristics of clients and their business success, and those that
address the relationship of business skills training and client
success. 2

Client Characteristics and Business Success?
Clients don’t arrive at microenterprise programs as blank
slates waiting to be written upon. Rather they come to programs with experiences, ambitions, and a set of strengths and
limitations that condition their ability to take advantage of
program services and become successful. Under the FIELDsponsored research, the grantees examined a range of personal
characteristics using a set of assessment tools applied either
before program entry or during the first few weeks of program
services. These characteristics were then compared to the business outcomes clients achieved. One organization, CVCAC,
also applied its assessment tool both before and after training
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to track the immediate effects of training on client perceptions
(of themselves) and on their living circumstances. The findings
suggest that there are, indeed, a set of characteristics that facilitate clients’ progress in starting or growing businesses. And
while not all clients can be influenced by program practice, a
number of them can be.

Exposure to Business Ownership
Not surprisingly, ISED found a strong, statistically significant
relationship 3 between entering training with a business and
completing training. These individuals are already committed
to business and seek specific information and support to help
it grow. But ISED also found that clients who were characterized by one of the following were also much more likely to
complete ISED’s 13-week training course:
• Previously owned a business.
• Grew up in a family that ran its own business.
• Worked in a family business while growing up.
• Had a business idea similar to the family business.
Current business owners were 19 percent more likely to
complete the training than nonbusiness owners at the start of
training. Previous business owners were 15 percent more likely
to complete than those who had never owned a business.
Participants who had early exposure to business ownership as
children were 30 percent more likely to complete training,
with those who worked in the business 21 percent more likely
to complete than those who did not.
Women’s Initiative also found that those with a business
were six percent more likely to graduate. Of those who were
operating a business when they entered the program, 91 percent graduated, while among those who were pre-startup at
entry, 85 percent graduated. This implied that the clients with
businesses were able to use the skills and therefore were
slightly more likely to complete the assignments and graduate.
Women’s Initiative also found that its “success circle” clients—
those who had achieved self-sufficiency 4 in the first 18 months
after completing training—were somewhat more likely to have
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business experience in their family background. Fifty-two percent of this group had someone who owned their own business
in their family, compared to 40 percent of the other clients.
Business ownership is also associated with progress on
securing financing. ISED clients who currently own a business,
have owned a business in the past, or have seriously checked
into business ownership before starting the training, are more
likely to have made progress in securing financing at the eightmonth mark after completion. 5

Relevant Work Experience
Women’s Initiative’s “success circle” clients had an average of
ten years of relevant work experience compared to the average
seven years that other clients had. While not statistically significant, ISED found that clients who had a business outcome
had had more experience in managing and supervising other
employees, being responsible for a geographical area, and daily
opening or closing a store. They had jobs in which they
worked alone and interacted with customers, and had job or
volunteer experiences related to their current business idea.
Personal Support and Encouragement
ISED clients who are most likely to complete training have
extensive support systems. They have people who can watch
their children, run their errands, provide transportation, allow
the use of their phone, lend money, and give encouragement.
They have family members who support their plans.
Interestingly, in addition to having these resources, participants who complete the training are 46 percent more likely to
state that they also act as resources to other people who may
need similar help. 6 Women’s Initiative’s case study clients also
noted the importance of family support in making their start
in self-employment possible. This support was not only emotional but also financial.
WHEDCO’s case study data demonstrates how husbands
or partners could either limit or facilitate the functioning of
their clients’ daycare businesses. DEI found that forty percent
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of its study clients agreed or strongly agreed that the lack of
support from their spouse or significant other made it difficult
for them to operate their business. In one case study, a woman
business owner had to move her business back to a home-based
operation because of lack of support from her spouse. Income
was reduced by more than 50 percent within the first month of
closing the store location in a neighborhood-based mall.

Access to Basic Infrastructure
ISED found that if a client had access to the following basic
resources—reliable transport, driver’s license, telephone, computer, and bank account—the client was 12 percent more likely
to complete training.
WHEDCO also found that a home’s location greatly influenced the chance that a family daycare provider would conduct
a successful business. As with all other businesses and real
estate, the issue is location, location, location, and a client’s
access to a safe and secure environment for a business is critical.
Clarity of Client’s Goals, Level of Commitment, and
Basic Organizational Capacities
FIELD’s grantee research came to these conclusions through
somewhat different lenses, each one reinforcing the others.
ISED, for example, found that clients who opened, stabilized,
or expanded a business after training were 17 percent more
likely to have a definite business idea when they began the
training. Women’s Initiative, on the other hand, looked at the
business skills that its “success circle” clients said they used
most highly at six, twelve, and eighteen months after training,
and found that focus on business vision was one of the five
most highly rated behaviors at each check-in point.
WHEDCO, in its in-depth case study analysis, found that
all daycare providers who stated that they aspired to business
growth made progress toward that goal over the study period.
Other providers, whose motivations differed and focused more
on other factors, such as having children around, escaping a
city-mandated workfare assignment, staying home to raise
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their own children, or making a little extra money on the side,
did not evidence the same level of business growth as did the
first group.
Finally, CVCAC found that clients who were referred
directly to one-on-one technical assistance (bypassing core
training) tended to score on the high end of the intake instrument that measured both goal-setting abilities and basic organizational competencies (“perceptions”), and their level of
resources and stability in their life (“circumstances”). Their
research also demonstrated that clients could improve their
goal-setting and organizational competencies over the course of
a six-week training, as measured by their “perceptions” rating.
In a small sample of clients tested both before and after training,
CVCAC found that the overall scores increased for eight of ten
respondents. The median increase was 1.07 points on a sevenpoint scale.

What Have We Learned about
Core Training and Client Success?
Clients Do Acquire Business Skills through Training
Programs tested skill acquisition in different ways. Women’s
Initiative, for example, requires that clients complete a set of
seven assignments throughout the training period to graduate.
Graduation then means that clients have at least a basic understanding of fourteen core business skills, as well as the
development of eleven core competencies. 88 percent of
Women’s Initiative’s research sample graduated during the
period under study. Follow-up surveys documented that all the
skills taught are being used by at least some clients.
WHEDCO assesses skill use through quarterly home visits
that are part of the program’s monitoring of family daycare
providers in its network. Specific skills are assessed by observation and rated on an assessment instrument. WHEDCO’s
case study analysis found that clients learned and effectively
applied the core knowledge related to childcare operations,
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such as regulatory compliance, child development, and the
basics of business management. And all providers advanced at
least one stage along a continuum of business development that
measures their movement from pre-startup through having an
established, at-capacity business offering high-quality care.
ISED asked clients to rate their level of confidence in
explaining key business concepts both at the beginning and end
of core training, using a five-point scale. They also implemented
follow-up surveys to ask clients which concepts they valued
eight months after training. The maximum score clients could
give themselves in terms of their confidence in explaining 15
different business concepts was 75 points. Before training, the
average score was 47.54 points. After training, that score had
increased by 16.77 points to 64.31. Not surprisingly, clients
who had never owned a business reported a greater gain in
skills (17.94) than clients who were current or previous business owners (15.45), but they started with lower confidence
scores than either of the other two groups. Overall, clients
reported the greatest gains in three areas: knowing what information to take to the bank for financing; understanding the
four major parts of a business plan; and understanding what
goes on a cash-flow sheet. However, these three skill areas are
not rated the highest in terms of confidence at the end of training. While clients felt they learned the most in these areas, they
don’t feel they have completely mastered these skills.

The Skills Clients Use the Most
It appears from the research that clients understand the importance of a business vision and value the learning regarding business planning needed to make that vision a reality. They apply
basic financial skills like record-keeping and break-even analysis, and they have learned the importance of knowing their
immediate target market well.
Women’s Initiative found that as time passes, other skills
also receive high ratings in terms of use. At 12 months, clients
include their ability to “accurately describe my competition”
among their top used skills, suggesting a greater focus on the
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competitive aspects of running a business. And at 18 months,
they include pricing (“I have a pricing system that is working
for my business”) among their top four skills. Trainers think
that these shifts reflect real changes in what is needed to manage a business as it stabilizes and grows. The client is focused
on achieving her goals, adjusting her activities along the way,
first with a focus on the immediate market, then reaching for
a larger market presence with analyses of the competition, and
finally, adjusting pricing to maintain market position and
viability.
Women’s Initiative further found that cash flow and financial statements were least used among their clients, while ISED
found that their clients valued learning how to do a cash flow
even in the earliest months. While this difference may reflect
some underlying differences in the clients and businesses of
each institution, it may also reflect a difference in training content and emphasis. In fact, Women’s Initiative trainers recognized that they introduced financial statements late in the
training cycle and are now adjusting the curriculum to introduce them earlier and in smaller, manageable components.

More Successful Clients
The programs found significant differences in skill acquisition
between more and less successful clients. ISED, for example,
compared the pre- and post-training scores of those who had a
business eight months after completing training with those
who did not start a business. Interestingly, the business owners
group—who included both existing businesses and start-ups—
had reported a higher gain in skills overall from the training
than those who later did not start a business (a 15.82 gain versus a 14.47 gain). There was also a significant difference in their
change in confidence for seven specific skills, including those
related to getting a loan, filling out cash flow statements, goal
setting, credit repair, and marketing. What does this finding
suggest? We already know that clients with positive business
outcomes are more likely to have entered training with a clear
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business idea or existing business. They are also more likely to
have some business or relevant work experience and strong
support systems. Being ready to go makes them attend to, and
appreciate more, the specific skills they are taught, and it further reinforces the need for programs to help clients develop
that state of readiness. Does it also suggest that clients reporting lower confidence levels in specific skills are “at risk” and
may require more technical support to succeed in business?
Women’s Initiative, comparing the skills acquisition of
their “success circle” clients to other clients, found that the
more successful consistently reported using a set of important
financial skills. At each survey, their responses indicated that
they were strongly focused on keeping financial records, using
break-even analysis, and applying their pricing skills. While
other clients also reported keeping records, they did not mention it as consistently over the 18-month reporting period, nor
was it ranked as highly as the “success circle” ranked it.
(“Success circle” clients ranked it first or second at each of the
three interviews; it did not make it among the top five skills
reported by other clients at six months, but ranked fifth at one
year and second at 18 months).
“Success circle” clients also included pricing among their
top five skills at each check-in. Pricing did not make the list for
the other clients. In its case study, WHEDCO echoed the
importance of pricing strategies. WHEDCO found that its
higher earners were those who were able to stand up to pressures to undercharge, something to which many daycare
providers succumb because of their sympathy for struggling
families, or because they care for children of friends and relatives. The more successful providers were found to be those
who could enforce a standard rate for most clients, including
family and friends, and who could vigorously recruit parents
with subsidy money, making them more able to pay a standard
rate.
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Completing a Business Plan Is Associated with Making
Progress
While developing a business plan is emphasized in ISED training, it is not a graduation requirement. The organization found
that only 5 percent of training completers had a formal written
business plan. An additional 17 percent had a nearly completed
plan, and 50 percent left with a draft. The remaining 28 percent did not have one at all. Not surprisingly, clients who have
a business plan were 24 percent more likely to have a business
after finishing training, and 45 percent more likely to have
made progress on securing financing for their business. 7 More
than three-quarters of clients who reported any progress on
securing financing for their business had a completed or nearly
completed business plan.
As common sense would dictate, those who pursue a loan
are much more likely to do the hard work of creating a formal
business plan. Those who are either in business when they
enter training, or who have a strong business idea, may also see
the value of the plan more clearly than others. Nevertheless,
even when its importance is recognized, many entrepreneurs
find it difficult to prepare and use a plan. DEI’s clients, for
example, admitted that while they recognized the importance
of preparing and adhering to a good business plan, it was very
easy to become immersed in the day-to-day management of the
business and lose sight of it. They reported that one value of
the continuing technical assistance relationship they experienced under the research project was that their business consultants kept them focused on using the plan as a guide for
making business decisions.
Training Completion
Women’s Initiative graduates from the core training were 40
percent more likely to experience business growth than those
who did not complete the workshop. The organization found
that 75 percent of its graduates experienced business-growth
events (defined as new start-ups, stabilizations, or expansions);
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only 36 percent of nongraduates experienced these growth
events. And 100 percent of clients who attained self-sufficiency
due to self-employment alone graduated from training.
Importantly, ISED found that having a business outcome
(a start, stabilization, or expansion) after training completion
correlated with a set of actions, including completing a business plan, making progress on securing needed financing, completing class assignments, and achieving a high attendance rate.
Each of these activities depends on client behavior and reflects
his or her level of commitment to the endeavor. They are critical milestones that demonstrate to both the client and the program that positive movement is being made toward achieving a
business goal. And they suggest that the more a program is able
to offer a structured training process with clear expectations,
participation requirements, and work assignments, the more
likely that clients will obtain positive results.
Sustained participation in training that fosters accountability appears to be particularly important to client success.
WHEDCO, for example, found only a very imperfect link
between its case study clients participating in a variety of short
courses and seminars and their ultimate success. CVCAC also
found that clients who engaged in one-on-one technical assistance without prior training were less likely to report that they
had been doing effective business planning since leaving the
program.

Dynamic Training Style
ISED’s large training program provided a good opportunity to
test the relationship between the process aspects of training
and the effects on client learning and behavior. While the
organization uses a standard curriculum, trainers—all former
or current business owners—have some latitude in the way
they deliver the content. ISED researchers observed the trainers and rated their performance on a set of characteristics that
fell along a continuum from dynamic to didactic. While no
trainer fell completely to one end of the continuum or the
other, dynamic trainers tended to rely on personal experiences
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in addition to the curriculum, set the pace of the class on participants’ behavior, viewed the trainer’s role as a guide or
resource person, and encouraged discussion among participants. Didactic trainers, on the other hand, relied more on the
curriculum and less on their personal experience, used it to set
the pace of the class, viewed their role as a teacher, and tended
to discourage discussion among participants.
In comparing these trainer characteristics to client behaviors and outcomes, researchers found that clients with dynamic
trainers were 21 percent more likely to complete homework
assignments and 20 percent more likely to complete the training. They were also 32 percent more likely to prepare a complete business plan, and finally, were five percent more likely
to have an open business within eight months of training completion. All these results were statistically significant, although
the difference demonstrated for the last was the least strong. 8
Given that ISED was not able during this research period to
track clients for a longer term, it is not yet known whether the
effect would lessen or increase as the time lengthened.

Implications for Training Practice
In reviewing and analyzing the findings of this research,
FIELD grantees came to a number of conclusions regarding
their implications for what constitutes best practice in
microenterprise training services. In summary, the research
and experience of the FIELD grantees underscores three key
findings:
• Effective microenterprise training programs acknowledge the
importance of client readiness for business and offer a range of
services to help clients acquire the resources and experiences necessary. Readiness implies that clients have some clarity in
their goals and business vision, have business exposure or relevant work experience, and have personal support and a minimum set of material conditions to assist them in their
business venture. Effective programs recognize these requirements and help clients recognize them as well. They offer
well-designed assessment processes, proactive referrals to
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needed services, links to relevant work experiences, and
training designed to improve goal-setting skills and clarify
and test business ideas. This statement should not be interpreted to mean that less-ready clients should not be expected
to make progress in business activity and that business training should not be offered to them. Rather, the finding suggests that business training and program design should offer
more activities geared toward improving client readiness
when necessary.
• Effective microenterprise training is designed and delivered
using the best adult learning theory. Effective adult learning
methodology includes respect for learners and the creation
of a safe environment in which to learn. It emphasizes content that has immediate and practical relevance, and accountability that includes clear expectations of the responsibilities
of both the program and the students. The training involves
participatory and dynamic methods that build on clients’
experiences and engage them actively in class activities. It
emphasizes the specific skills that clients will apply in the
initial stages of business development and provides ample
opportunity for them to practice them through a series of
small, short-term attainable steps. Effective training helps
clients understand the link between their attendance and
completion of key assignments and their ultimate business
success, and creates opportunities for clients and staff
together to monitor and measure progress. Best-practice programs recruit and hire trainers not just for business skills but
also for their capacity to implement participatory learning,
and which provides them with opportunities to increase
their skills through in-service training and other opportunities.
• Effective microenterprise training ensures that clients learn key
financial and marketing skills, as well as the “soft skills” or basic
competencies that increase a microentrepreneur’s ability to
apply them effectively. The research shows that while most
clients increase their understanding and use of business skills,
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there are some differences between more and less successful
clients. More than others, successful clients emphasize the
application of basic financial skills, including record keeping, cash-flow management, and break-even analysis. They
understand the importance of knowing their customers well,
positioning themselves in relationship to competitors, and
pricing their products and services appropriately. Effective
microenterprise training emphasizes the mastery of these
skills and provides clients ample opportunity to understand
them, practice them, and apply them during training. In
addition, best-practice programs recognize that being in business requires more than just technical expertise. Thus they
teach clients to be successful in the marketplace through critical thinking, strong decision making, broad networking,
and effective communication.

Notes
1. The Microenterprise Fund for Innovation, Effectiveness, Learning, and
Dissemination (FIELD) is a research and development program at the Aspen
Institute dedicated to the expansion and sustainability of microenterprise development efforts, particularly those aimed at poor Americans. Its mission is to
identify, develop, and disseminate best practices, and to broadly educate policymakers, funders, and others about microenterprise as an antipoverty intervention. This article is drawn from a larger monograph, Improving Microenterprise
Training and Technical Assistance: Findings for Program Managers (February,
2002), which can be found on FIELD’s website, www.fieldus.org/li/training,
along with detailed research reports produced by FIELD’s five grantees who participated in this initiative.
2. This document summarizes the key findings related to training effectiveness. It also highlights the most important findings with respect to appropriate
measures of intermediate and final impact. More on the relationship between
technical assistance and client success can be found in the complete monograph
referenced in footnote 1. More on indicators and on practical approaches for
documenting and assessing outcomes is available in FIELD’s companion document, Practitioner Manual: Assessment Tools for Microenterprise Training &
Technical Assistance. See FIELD’s Web site (www.fieldus.org/li/training) for
additional, related material.
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3. ISED applied a variety of statistical methods to analyze the relationships
among participant characteristics, training interventions, intermediate indicators, and final participant outcomes. Methods included descriptive, bivariate,
and multivariate statistical procedures. ISED has reported findings of statistical
significance at the 90-percent confidence level and higher. P levels are reported
at .10, .05, .01, and .001. Unless otherwise noted in the text, all findings reported
from the ISED study meet these levels of statistical significance. Readers interested in more information should consult the ISED study on FIELD’s Web site.
4. Women’s Initiative used the self-sufficiency standard developed as a measure of success by Dr. Diana Pearce of the University of Washington School of
Social Work and the Wider Opportunities for Women (WOW) based in
Washington, D.C. This standard calculates the amount of money working adults
need to meet their basic needs without subsidies of any kind. Unlike the federal
poverty standard (HHS) or the median income guidelines (HUD), this standard
takes into account the cost of living as it varies by family type (number of adults
and number and ages of children) and county. The calculation includes local
housing, childcare, food, transportation, medical care, clothing and miscellaneous costs, as well as taxes and tax credit. For purposes of comparison, the selfsufficiency standard income level falls at approximately 90 percent of the HUD
median area income level (“moderate income”) for a family of two adults in San
Francisco County.
5. ISED’s research methodology involved tracking classes of clients entering
at different stages during the two-year research process. The greatest length of
time all groups were from training completion was eight months, and ISED used
that time point to define the end of data collection.
6. The difference between completers and noncompleters with respect to
these characteristics is statistically significant at the very high level of .001.
7. Significant at the highest confidence level of .0001.
8. The difference in training completion rates was significant at the .001
level. The differences in rates of class assignment completion and business plan
completion were significant at the .01 level. And the difference in business outcomes was significant at the .10 level.
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What Does It Take
to Borrow?
A Framework for Analysis
by Caroline E. Glackin
Abstract: This paper introduces a framework for the analysis of the
barriers, costs and constraints microloan customers in the United
States encounter. While much previous work has been done on the
benefits and potential of microenterprise in the United States as well
as the program costs, relatively little research has explored the process
from the perspective of the customer. This paper first introduces the
gap between loan fund capital and loan disbursement. It then posits a
framework for understanding the customer perspective. Further
research is recommended to determine which factors are salient and
how they can be applied to benefit microloan customers and microlenders in the United States context.

In the past twenty years, microenterprise development tried to
alleviate poverty in the United States. Initially, practitioners
and policy makers presumed that the lack of access to capital
was the primary impediment for the self-employed to start and
sustain their businesses. Because financial institutions are riskadverse to borrowers with weak credit histories, insufficient
collateral, and limited or no business experience, alternative
vehicles to credit were required. So microloan funds proliferated in the 1980s and 90s to serve this market. But the experience of practitioners today indicates that lack of demand and
not supply is the principal challenge facing the field. There are
simply too many dollars and too few customers. In attempting
to understand this dynamic, few have researched the costs, barriers, and constraints for potential borrowers participating in
these programs well.
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The premise of this article is that the full range of costs of
microborrowing are seriously underestimated. Included in
these costs is a program design that in itself creates potential
barriers to access. When they identify these barriers and understand their costs, practitioners can develop lower-cost, highervolume and -impact models for the delivery of credit and
training.
This paper suggests a framework for the range of costs
incurred by individual customers of microloan 1 programs in
the United States and the barriers and constraints to borrowing. The first objective is to identify the primary drivers of
microenterprise borrowing. The second is to propose a framework for further research and analysis. These findings include
implications for both policy makers and practitioners.

Barriers to Borrowing and Consumption Costs
Understanding the barriers to borrowing, constraints, and
costs in microloan programs is necessary to fully understand
the microenterprise development industry in the United
States. The bulk of the research completed to date has analyzed
program design, delivery, and outputs. Substantial research
regarding impact is underway, primarily under the auspices of
the Aspen Institute’s FIELD program. Recently, some research
addressing transaction costs and subsidies to program costs has
begun to emerge. However, little work has been done on consumption costs and their implications for microlending. We
need a thorough understanding of both the benefits and costs
in order to judge the efficacy of United States microlending.
When microloans were introduced in the United States,
the primary emphasis was on providing small amounts of
Caroline Glackin is the Executive Director of the First State Community Loan Fund, a
Delaware Community Development Financial Institution with small business, microenterprise, housing, and community development lending and Individual Development
Accounts (IDA) programs. She is a doctoral candidate in the School of Urban Affairs and
Public Policy at the University of Delaware. Caroline earned an M.B.A. in
Entrepreneurial Management from The Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania. Email: CGlackin@firststateloan.org.
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capital to microentrepreneurs who could not borrow from
mainstream financial institutions. Over the years, the field was
successful in obtaining capital from the U.S. Small Business
Administration (and later the Community Development
Institutions Fund), national and local foundations, and state
and local government. Of the 159 microloan funds with sufficient data available for tabulation in the 1999 Directory of U.S.
Microenterprise Programs (Langer, Orwick, & Kays, 1999), the
total loan pool capital adds to $117,138,269. There is no information on outstanding loans, but total cumulative lending is
$130,492,113 from the beginning of microloans, with
$91,782,828 in loans from the top 20 percent of lending programs. In 74 of the 159 programs, the loan pool is greater than
the cumulative lending, with a minimum of approximately $32
million in available idle funds. Given typical loan terms of
three months to three years, and the age of the program, this
indicates that supply of microloan capital greatly exceeds
demand. A recent survey of more than 30 loan programs in
California showed that over 50% of the capital was not loaned
out and that seven loans per year was typical (Bhatt, Painter, &
Tang, 1999).
This surplus of capital among almost half of the programs
can be attributed to a number of possible causes due to factors
either on the supply side or the demand side. One supply factor is that the rapid increase of funding availability has outpaced the capacity of programs to attract more microloan
customers. Many programs began to receive large capital infusions in the 1990s. Also, many programs were new in 1997, the
most recent reporting year of the survey. Another possible
explanation is incomplete or insufficient information flows to
target populations. Demand-side factors include lack of
demand for capital and lack of viable microloan customers.
Among all of the possible causes for lack of scale in
microlending, this analysis explores the cost of consumption of
microloans in the United States, the barriers to access, and the
constraints on microentrepreneurs. While these factors undelie
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the concerns of information flows, demand, and qualifications,
they transcend these simple explanations and uncover a complex and diverse set of issues that have a profound effect on the
ability of microloan programs to serve the poor.
There are a variety of costs associated with borrowing
from a microloan program in the United States. The cost to the
customer is not simply the interest rate plus fees, although that
is the most explicit portion of the costs. Microloan costs
include financial costs, transaction costs, and psychosocial
costs. In addition, systematic barriers and constraints could
also have an impact on the microentrepreneur’s desire and ability to obtain a microloan. These barriers include discrimination, regulations and laws, and information gaps. A summary
of these cost factors, barriers, and constraints is included in
Table 1.
The borrower’s cost to obtain a loan, or the perceived
price of the loan, is the sum of the transaction costs plus the
financial costs. It is possible that consumption costs 2 of
microloans are so high that microentrepreneurs cannot afford
them, even though they would qualify for them. The analysis
that follows includes a discussion of the categories of costs for
microloan customers as well as the barriers to borrowing.

Theories of Consumption
and Their Relevance to Microenterprise
Any discussion of the consumption of goods or services and
the costs of the process of consuming them is grounded in economic theories of consumption and consumer behavior. In this
case, we turn briefly to consumption in general and the consumption of social welfare goods and services.
Microloan customers in the United States are individual
consumers of microloan products. They have a choice,
although constrained, whether or not they choose to obtain a
microloan. In economic terms, the decision to borrow is either
based on maximizing or satisfying utility. Because entrepreneurship can easily be understood as the customer’s best
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avaiable option (Servon, 1999), I am assuming satisfying behavior. Therefore, we can expect microloan customers to borrow
at the level that satisfies their needs to the best of their ability.
So the expected utility of the microloan must exceed its cost.
Although we are not performing a complete cost-benefit
study, we can observe that when microentrepreneurs borrow
from microlenders, they receive a “bundled good,” much as
homeowners buy not only a home (shelter) but the features,
benefits and amenities associated with that home. In the case of
a microloan, the bundle may consist of the products or services
acquired with the proceeds, the value of training and technical
assistance, pride of ownership, the power of self-determination, and anticipated earnings.
It is the consumption costs of services for social welfare
that are at the core of the analysis that follows. While
microloans are not public goods and are generally not offered
by government entities, they act like government-provided
goods and services in many ways and carry their characteristics:
• Microloans can support social welfare objectives. Microloans
are available to the “disadvantaged” entrepreneurs who are
either on the margins or are disconnected from the mainstream.
• They are available through third-sector and public-sector
organizations, albeit often with private-sector support.
• They are priced at an interest rate well below “cost” and are
offered for unbankable customers.
The consumption costs of such goods are not particularly
well understood but are typically regressive and include participation costs (Warren & Weschler, 1986). Services may not be
consumable as available or may be too costly, thereby pricing
people out of consumption when they do not have the
resources to be. These costs include such factors as time, effort, money, and psychological and physical burdens. In
essence, goods are effectively rationed via these consumption
costs. This framework applies directly to microlenders and
entrepreneurs.
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* Predominant burden

U= up-front costs

D=distributed over time

Lack of Collateral (U) (DD)

** DD=demand side, SS=supply side

Lack of Business Knowledge (D) (DD)

Buffer Funds/Mandatory Savings (U)

Transportation(D)

Learning Factors (U) (DD)

Insufficient Social Capital (U) (DD)

Group Loan Payments (D)

Group Loan Costs (D)

Service Charges (D)

Geographic Constraints (U) (DD/SS)

Credit History (U) (DD)

United States (U) (DD)

Lack of Documentation of Legal Standing in the

Information Gaps (U) (DD)

Regulatory and Legal Constraints (U) (DD)

Discrimination-race, gender, class (U) (DD)

Barriers/Constraints**

Lack of Trust and Fear of Formal Institutions (D) (DD)

Lost Wages (U)

Interest (D)

Frustration (D)

Stigma (D)

Risk Aversion (U)

Loss of Privacy (U)

Psychosocial Costs

Taxes & compliance (D)

Equity Required (U)
Loss of Means-Tested Benefits (U)

Late Fees & Penalties (D)

Pledged Collateral (U)

Technical Assistance Fees (U)
Child Care (U)

Technical Assistance Time (U)
Travel Time (U)

Closing Costs (U)

Training Time (U)

Application Fees (U)
Training Fees (U)

Transaction Costs

Financial Costs

Table 1. Cost Factors and Barriers and Constraints for Microloan Customers in the United States*
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Categories of Costs to Microloan Customers
The costs of microloans for United States customers are not
routinely calculated by programs or researchers. However,
when an estimate of customer costs is made, it usually includes
the cost of capital and, perhaps, any loan fees and charges.
While these two direct costs may capture a portion of the total
financial costs to the microloan customer, there are additional
implicit financial costs that borrowers must bear, oftentimes
regardless of whether they ultimately receive capital. Among
these financial costs are (1) fees for required training and technical assistance; (2) transportation; (3) childcare; and (4) membership charges. In addition, transaction costs associated with
the direct requirements of microloan programs add to borrower costs. A final category of additional costs is that of psychological and social costs, such as stigma associated with
the inability to borrow from banks and the need to obtain
cosigners.

Financial Costs
The financial costs of microloans vary considerably from program to program and are not necessarily directly proportional
to the amount borrowed or to the financial capacity of the
microloan customer. If anything, these financial costs are
regressive, creating the greatest burden on those least able to
pay. Many programs require extensive training for first-time
business owners, which, although generally free of charge, does
include other financial costs. Entrepreneurs with little or no
collateral and equity, and poor credit histories, and start-up
enterprises are more likely to need the services of a microlender and be subject to training and technical assistance requirements. They may also have to compensate for poor credit
histories with cosigners and have to participate in credit counseling and repair. Many of these costs are incurred up front,
before the customer obtains any microloan benefits. The financial burden of these requirements can be considerable.
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a. Interest rates—Microloan programs charge a wide range
of rates; the average rates reported in the 1999 Directory of
U.S. Microenterprise Programs (Langer, Orwick, & Kays,
1999) ranged from about 10% to 18%. These rates are higher
than those of commercial loans but lower than most credit
cards, particularly subprime cards. These are the most explicit
financial costs for loan customers and are ongoing costs.
b. Application fees—Microloan programs may charge application, commitment, and closing fees. Application fees may be
nonrefundable and may be charged up front.
c. Service charges—Some microloan programs charge a
monthly or per loan service charge. Until recently, one program charged a 4% fee on each loan. For a customer with a few
months’ loan, the effective rate was far in excess of the nominal rate.
d. Late fees and other penalties—With loan delinquency rates
ranging from 10% to 60% in microloan portfolios (Edgcomb,
Klein, & Clark, 1996), it is apparent that there are both late
fees and bounced-check charges on microloans. These are particularly burdensome for those living in poverty or on the margins of poverty, for which a $25 late charge may be a large part
of their income.
e. Closing costs—Out-of-pocket costs incurred by microlenders to secure mortgages and liens plus any legal costs. These
costs will vary considerably and are expected to be higher for
larger-dollar loans. They may range from zero to several hundred dollars and are generally up-front costs.
f. Training fees—When entrepreneurs are required to attend
training classes in order to qualify for loans, they may have
either class fees or materials fees for these trainings. The range
of costs may be from zero to a few hundred dollars. Within a
given loan program, they may be essentially fixed or have a
step function, depending on loan amount, but they are usually
incurred up front.
g. Technical assistance—While most microloan programs do
not charge for technical assistance, some do (Langer, Orwick,
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& Kays, 1999). They may have hourly rates, sometimes on a
sliding scale. Also, some entrepreneurs may pay brokers or
consultants to assist in the preparation of business plans or
loan applications. Most of these costs would be up front, with
potential continuing costs for ongoing assistance.
h. Transportation—Microloan customers must incur transportation costs in order to attend training sessions or meet
with business counselors, loan officers, or peer groups.
Depending upon proximity and transit options, these costs
may vary considerably. In addition, programs that require
more training classes or counseling sessions result in higher
transportation costs for customers. Transportation costs may
be heavily front-end loaded for training and technical assistance, but they may continue after the loan is received in a peer
group setting or when payments are made in person.
i. Childcare—Many microloan customers are single mothers
who must find childcare for their children when they attend
classes, meetings, and events. For those with the weakest social
networks and family linkages, this burden is likely to be
greater than others.
j. Taxes and costs of compliance—When microloan customers
must move from the informal economy to the formal economy
in order to access microloan dollars, they incur additional
financial costs. For example, reporting microenterprise income
on income taxes can increase the tax burden.
Taken together, these financial costs can be quite substantial, particularly for a low-income microloan customer.
Whether we assume that customers have complete or incomplete knowledge of the costs and are consumption maximizers,
a number of potential costs become clear, some of which are
known, others of which are less obvious and they can be high
relative to the size of loan.

Transaction Costs
Beyond the direct financial costs are a number of transaction
costs associated with microloans. Transaction costs in
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microloans can be understood as nonfinancial costs incurred
during the lending process from its beginning until its end.
Microloan customers encounter a range of costs associated
with the time spent in obtaining a microloan and subsequent
time spent on programs and events associated with the
microloan. The customer might otherwise have been engaged
in other more rewarding activities, including but not limited to
wage employment, self-employment income generation, and
other opportunities. One could argue that the time spent in
microenterprise development and training might be better
spent in adult, vocational, or post-secondary education.
a. Training time—Because programs require between zero
and ninety hours of training, they reflect a broad cost range.
No analysis has determined the direct benefit of microenterprise training, nor has one established the optimal type and
quantity of training to deliver. In any case, training brings
with it both potential benefits and clear opportunity costs.
b. Technical assistance time—Requirements appear more
flexible, the borrower having greater control over the amount
of time spent and the location of the assistance. Their opportunity is cost associated with technical assistance, and most of
the burden is up front, with potential future benefits.
c. Travel time—In addition to the financial cost of travel,
there is the opportunity cost. For those in rural areas, travel
time may be particularly burdensome. Programs requiring frequent or multiple meetings and training classes add to this
opportunity cost.
d. Lost wages—For some microloan customers who are
“patching” self-employment earnings with waged-employment
earnings, meetings or training sessions held during their working hours may result in lost wages. For those who are unemployed or who participate during nonworking hours, costs
may be counted in lost opportunities.
e. Pledged collateral—Requirements to pledge collateral
impose an opportunity cost by tying up the resources so that
they cannot be used for another purpose.
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f. Equity contribution requirements—When microloan programs require up-front equity contributions, they may deplete
the savings of a borrower. Such equity contributions may be
required to demonstrate that the borrower has exhibited “good
faith” and has made an investment in his or her business and
has something of value at risk.
g. Social-welfare policy costs—For microentrepreneurs
receiving means-tested benefits, there can be costs associated
with social-welfare policies. Under a range of programs,
including Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Training (JOBS)
and the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) (P.L. 97–300),
self-employment is either not an option or can result in the
loss of benefits (Raheim, 1997). In fact, for certain people who
receive income support, self-employment may result in worsened financial circumstances rather than improved ones
(Raheim, 1997).

Psychosocial Costs
In addition to the direct financial costs and the opportunity
costs that a microloan customer may encounter, certain social
and psychological burdens and costs may be associated with
borrowing from a microlender. While there are inherent challenges in determining dollar values, it is critical that these factors be recognized for their potential to prevent borrowing.
a. Stigma—The stigma effects of borrowing from a
microlender rather than a bank have not yet been documented.
Microloan programs are often known only to a small group of
people within a community and serve as the “lender of last
resort.” Microloan customers may be required to provide cosigners in order to receive their loans. A microloan borrower
essentially acknowledges an inability to access credit by borrowing from a microlender.
b. Frustration—The process of becoming a microloan customer is generally neither seamless nor rapid. Numerous steps
and processes are involved, even in the quickest and least
restrictive cases. In particular, having to attend numerous
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training classes and to respond to multiple requests for
information during the application process can be perceived as
bothersome. Even if the training is helpful and the customer
understands the need for the information, the time and effort
required, not to mention the financial costs, can be a source of
frustration.
c. Concerns about privacy—Related to the previous issues is
the issue of privacy. Potential microloan customers must generally share considerable personal data in order to obtain small
amounts of credit. They may not want to share their information with virtual strangers. Because of negative experiences
with institutional actors, they may shy away from providing
personal information. In addition, borrowers may be concerned about revealing immigration information or formalizing illegal or informal activities.
d. Risk aversion—While concerns about risk are anticipated
in any entrepreneurial transaction, the risks of failure for
microloan customers may be more profound than for those in
the mainstream. For a microloan customer who has very limited assets, the risk of losing those assets is disproportionately
large. The risk of being unable to repay the loan out of the
income from the entrepreneurial enterprise can also be problematic; required repayment terms could outstrip the ability to
repay out of earned income should the business fail. All these
issues reflect potential challenges for microloan customers.
The self-employed poor must have support networks of
families and friends to assist them with these risks (Schreiner,
1999). During crises, it is family and friends that offer insurance in the forms of cash and in-kind (Bates & Servon, 1996).
However, this is particularly problematic for those most disconnected from the mainstream. “Microlending will not help
those who rely heavily on a societal safety net,” says Richard
Taub. “It is most likely to help those who already have at least
one moderately secure income” (Taub, 1998).
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Systematic Barriers and Constraints
There is also a range of systematic barriers and constraints that
has an impact both on the microentrepreneur’s ability to and
interest in obtaining a microloan. These barriers include discrimination, regulatory and legal factors, and information
gaps, to name a few. In addition, there are trust, social capital,
and business constraints.

Discrimination
Much has been written on discrimination in general and relative to discrimination in small business credit markets.
Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman used data from the
1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances to determine
that constraints on credit for minority-owned firms are greater
than those faced by white-owned firms, including more frequent denial of applications and higher interest rates (1998).
Also, research indicates that black-owned firms experience particularly large capital constraints (Bates, 1997). Concerns
about being turned down may prevent black-owned firms from
being formed or applying for loans (Blanchflower, Levine, &
Zimmerman, 1998).
Regulatory and Legal Constraints
As has been widely reported, microloans work particularly
well in places where the majority of the adults are selfemployed and where the barriers to self-employment are very
low. Neither of these factors is prevalent in the United States.
The complexity of owning and operating a business, including
the multitude of regulatory and legal constraints, is formidable. While microentrepreneurs may operate in the informal
economy without regard for these legal and regulatory factors,
microloan programs may require compliance.
a. Licenses and regulation—Programs may require that businesses obtain appropriate licenses and comply with industry
regulations, thereby creating a financial burden by reducing
revenues and increasing taxes. For example, a child care
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provider may have more children in her care while unlicensed
than when she is licensed. At a weekly rate of $60, it could
mean a loss of $3,120 per year in revenues alone in order to
obtain a small amount of capital, if the number of children
must decrease by one.
Regulations and laws also increase the level of complexity
of transactions and the borrowing process. A microloan in the
United States may entail multiple legal documents and additional legal costs. Microentrepreneurs must also understand the
regulations regarding their specific business and take measures
to comply. Zoning laws and child labor laws may prevent
microbusinesses from operating out of a home and may keep
children from helping out (Schreiner, 2000). Both taxes and
compliance with regulations have noncash costs that make it
expensive to operate in the “’formal” sector in the United
States. In fact, Schreiner states, “Taxes and compliance have
invisible transaction and opportunity costs that may swamp
their visible cash costs, and their quasi-fixed nature impinges
regressively on small firms” (2000, p. 17). Either compliance or
noncompliance is a dangerous position for a fragile enterprise.
Also, three of the most common types of enterprises run by
women (food service, beauty salons, and child care) require
licenses in the United States, thus increasing the cost of entry
(Schreiner & Morduch, 2000).
b. Operational complexities— United States microloan customers encounter operational complexities that do not pertain to their counterparts in the third world. They must be
good at far more than producing a product. Schreiner (2000,
p. 13) explains, “They not only provide the service or make
the good that earns revenues, but they also pay taxes, comply
with regulations, supervise employees, maintain a locale,
attract customers, and find suppliers. Entrepreneurs must wear
many hats, and some of them may not fit well.”
c. Documentation—An additional microloan barrier can be
the lack of documentation of legal standing in the United
States as required by some microlenders.
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Economic Factors
A range of economic factors affect microloan customers.
Economists have looked at consumption and liquidity from an
entrepreneurial perspective for a number of years (Evans &
Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, & Rosen, 1994).
Evans and Jovanovic (1989) provided a model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity constraints using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. They explain
that the liquidity constraint has two ways of reducing the flow
of capital to entrepreneurship: by preventing some people
from trying entrepreneurship (1.3% of the population) and
through the ones who do try entrepreneurship using less capital because of the constraint. Some economists argue that lack
of access to loans is not a constraint (Cressy, 2000; Xu, 1998).
The reason loans can be a constraint is because they require
collateral, which, in turn, requires savings. If loans matter at
the margin, it is only if and when skills and savings are present
(Schreiner, 2000). Berger and Udell indicate that debt is constrained by wealth (1998).
a. Limited or poor credit history—Microentrepreneurs may
have a disadvantage when searching for business loans because
they either have no credit or poor credit. Those with good
credit may have access to commercial bank loans or credit
cards to finance their businesses. As Schreiner and Morduch
note, “In the Third World, the task of microfinance is to judge
the risk of self-employed borrowers new to formal credit; in
the United States, the task is often to judge the risk of selfemployed borrowers with bad credit records” (2000, p. 11).
For example, in Himes and Servon’s (1998) study, 25 percent of
the clients had bad credit records.
b. Relative opportunity to access other resources (credit cards,
loan sharks, title lenders)—This is not a barrier or constraint for
microloan customers; rather it is a concern for the microlender. While there may be a conception that microloans are the
only financing option for microloan customers, there may be
alternatives, such as credit cards, loan sharks, and title lenders.
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Bhatt (1997) asserts that the operational policies of some
microenterprise programs may have driven potential customers to seek other sources of financing, perhaps increasing
economic
inequities
rather
than
reducing
them.
Microentrepreneurs in the United States may be able to access
capital from sources other than microlenders. In one study, a
quarter of the ACCION borrowers either had defaults or
bankruptcies, and over half used microloans to consolidate
other debt (Himes & Servon, 1998). In addition, another study
reports that the bulk of the demand for microloans is probably
met via credit cards (Bates & Servon, 1996). The situation is
summarized as follows: “Although credit-card debt is high
priced, it has low transaction costs and very low total costs.
Likewise, loans from the so-called fringe banks—pawn shops,
check cashing outlets, and rent-to-own stores—have high prices
but low total cost.... Competition has pushed other financial
intermediaries closer to the poor” (Schreiner, 2000).
c. Lack of collateral—Another barrier for microloan customers is their lack of collateral to offer in support of their
loan. This is a demand-side constraint.

Information Asymmetries
A variety of information gaps may explain customer issues
with access to capital. These may be either demand-side or supply-side issues.
a. Lack of business knowledge and skills—This demand-side
barrier to self-employment and business capitalization is
vitally important to microentrepreneurs. Business knowledge
and business skills, such as finance, marketing, and previous
employment, have been associated with the ability to start and
operate a profitable business (Brush, 1990). This deficiency
may cause entrepreneurs to have businesses that do not support themselves and their families (Raheim, 1997). Bates notes,
“No serious studies have demonstrated that small amounts of
debt can overcome human-capital deficiencies that otherwise
minimize chances for business success” (Bates, 1997).
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b. Lack of knowledge about resource—Microloan programs
anecdotally indicate that the “build it and they will come” concept has not worked for them. Clearly, the numbers of entrepreneurs who have borrowed is less than anticipated, as
demonstrated by the failure to take up loan-pool capital. If
entrepreneurs do not know about microloan programs, they
cannot borrow from them. Thus, lack of information can be
problematic, as can inaccurate or incomplete information. This
lack of information or presence of inaccurate or incomplete
information may be caused by the inability of microlenders to
market their services effectively. Or it may be the result of
rationing behavior on the part of microlenders.
c. Geographic constraints—These constraints come in a
number of forms, ranging from issues of proximity of training
and loan fund meeting locations to issues of personal safety and
comfort in going to meeting places. This is a particular problem in rural areas where there may be both transportationaccess issues and considerable distances to travel. Such
constraints may be problematic for customers and lenders.
d. Learning factors (style and basic literacy, financial
literacy)—Entrepreneurs do not all have precisely the same
style of learning or needs for information. They may have a
wide range of levels of basic literacy. If basic literacy is weak,
entrepreneurial training may then also be weak. Furthermore,
financial literacy skills, not just business record keeping, may
need to be taught.

Other Factors
In addition to the extensive list of barriers and constraints
above, other factors also may add to the burden of microloan
customers. These include lack of trust and shortages of social
capital.
a. Lack of trust—Microloan customers may come to
microlending programs with a built-in fear of formal institutions, including banks and governments. While microlenders
may not be as formal as these other entities, they do have an
institutional presence and can be threatening. The literature on
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the unbanked includes discussions of the horrendous experiences poor people have had with mainstream banks (Beverly,
Tescher, & Marzahl, 2001). These experiences have made people hesitant to enter into a relationship with a financial entity
of any kind.
b. Social networks/social capital—Microloan customers are
often single, minority mothers who do not have strong social
networks and family support. The absence of social capital is
projected to increase transaction costs.
In addition to the above analysis of entrepreneurs in general, it is noteworthy that when this issue is viewed through
the combined lenses of gender stratification and small business
analysis, additional barriers emerge. Loscocco and Robinson
suggest that gender segregation, skill deficits, lack of access to
capital and government contracts, and family responsibilities
apply to women entrepreneurs (1991). With the combination
of race and gender, there may be additional consumption costs
because of the simultaneous operation of these factors.

Conclusion
The framework described above is drawn from the literature
on microenterprise development. It paints a picture of a complex and diverse landscape of barriers, costs, and constraints
for United States microloan customers. With additional
research, this theoretical framework can be tested and modified. An analytical model and tool can be developed to assist
programs in understanding the costs, for their customers.
From a program and policy perspective, barriers, costs and
constraints that do not bear on risk of microloan default can be
minimized or eliminated. After further consideration, this
framework may open up opportunities to increase microlending in the United States.
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Notes
1. A microloan is defined as a loan of $25,000 or less for the owners of a business with five employees or less.
2. In the context of this paper, consumption costs are the costs of the
consumer to acquire and usefully utilize a microloan. Some of these costs are
readily quantifiable, while others are not. If consumption costs are too high,
potential and entitled consumers may be priced out of the market for
microloans.
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Book Review
The Myth of Development:
The Non-viable
Economics of the 21st
Century
by C. Beth Haynes
Oswaldo De Rivero has spent over three decades representing
Peru’s interests in various diplomatic positions. The Myth of
Development details his frustrations regarding the potential for
global poverty eradication in spite of decades-long development efforts by many poor nations. Only four countries
(Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong) are identified as having made the transition from poor to industrialized
during the past century, though many countries have followed
theoretical counsel in hopes of progress. Given this record, De
Rivero takes issue with the term “developing country” when
he sees the economies as stagnant, and suggests alternatives,
such as NNE (non-viable national economy) and UCE
(ungovernable chaotic entity).
Factors identified as contributing to the stagnant poverty
of countries include the “unstoppable process” of globalization
that is “beyond human control” and advances in technology
that reduce the amount of resources necessary per unit of output. Globalization is viewed as a means for transnational
corporations to make “inroads into the sovereignty of nation
states,” lessening the national capitalism which was basic to the
progress of the industrialized countries. Improvements in
telecommunications technology also have diminished the sovereignty of nation states. This and other technological
advances have reduced the amount of raw material needed per
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unit of output. Instead of hailing the more efficient use of the
world's limited resources, the increased efficiency is blamed
for increasing unemployment problems which are exaggerated
in less-skilled populations of workers. As transnational corporations become more influential players in the world economy,
De Rivero states that economic progress seems to be associated
with a “law of diminishing returns to national power” with
transnational companies as the new aristocracy.
Increasing materialism is noted as an additional cause for
the lack of economic progress in poor countries. The prosperous, who seek instant gratification, are not willing to forego
current consumption necessary for heavy investment in poor
countries. Those in poverty do not have the buying power to
influence the decisions of the increasingly powerful transnational corporations. Thus, the corporations cater to the
prosperous in both industrialized and developing countries.
This puts the transnational corporations into the position of
“increasing world power, whereas, paradoxically, they assume
no international responsibilities.” Power is becoming concentrated in those who are not accountable to the citizens of any
country. The newly powerful include heads of transnational
firms and leaders of organizations such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The large transnational
corporations are said to have “no nationality” though they do
have national origin and global interests.
In describing the myth of development, De Rivero writes
of the gap between theory and reality with respect to the economic concepts of comparative advantage and perfect competition. He laments that fact that efforts to focus on comparative
advantages have not attracted transnational investments into
poor countries, as he claims they should have according to theory. However, the theory of comparative advantage does not
deal with the attraction of transnational investment, and may
C. Beth Haynes is a professor of Economics in the School of Business at Brigham Young
University—Hawaii. She is also the book reviwe editor for the “Journal of Microfinance.”
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even discourage it. For example, if a country has a comparative
advantage in production of a labor-intensive product, such as
hand embroidered table cloths, there is little reason to expect
such specialization to serve as a stimulus for foreign investment to come into the country. If a transnational company had
a particular interest in the production of hand embroidered
tablecloths, it might invest in this country, but there is no reason to expect high or increased levels of international investment. The theory of comparative advantage simply states that
the greatest gain from trade is available to those countries that
specialize in the production of goods for which they have a
comparative advantage in production.
With respect to the theoretical benefits of perfect competition, De Rivero complains that theory implies the greatest
gains are available only when perfect competition prevails in
markets with minimal government intervention. It is clear that
no country has come close to meeting the theoretical requisites
for perfect competition, and so it seems harsh to condemn the
theory when imperfectly competitive activity does not produce results consistent with perfectly competitive market theory. De Rivero notes that government strategic initiatives were
coupled with market activity to foster the rapid growth of the
four newly industrializing countries of the twentieth century.
Scientific and technological backwardness is another challenge to economic progress addressed by De Rivero. Much of
the economic prosperity of industrialized nations can be attributed to scientific and technological leadership. With few scientists and researchers and growing international support for
intellectual property right protection, poor countries are not
able to develop or borrow technologies that would benefit the
poor. De Rivero claims that a major challenge facing these
countries is to overcome “their lack of historical and cultural
interest in scientific theory and applied science.” He also views
the current emphasis on information technology as a blow to
growth potential for non-prosperous countries. Instead of
national wealth stemming from a nation’s resource endowment,
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current trends appears to be one of wealth following information stocks and flows. De Rivero sees this as a negative for
poor countries because they currently lack information technologies. Others might see more potential for a country to
increase its information base than its resource base because
information is highly mobile.
Given these challenges, De Rivero sees a bleak future for
the currently poor. He adapts Darwin’s theory of the survival
of the fittest species to the economic arena, stating that “only
the most predatory economies prevail and reproduce transnationally, multiplying their growing returns,” and mutating
“towards a more economically fit and powerful species.” He
decries the misinterpretation of Adam Smith’s assumption that
individuals act in self-interest. Smith intended that self-interest
be viewed within the bounds of social propriety rather than as
sheer greed.
De Rivero’s final conclusion is that given these insurmountable obstacles, the poorest countries need to give up
their quests for development and progress and settle instead on
a quest for basic survival with foci on urban population stability and adequate supplies of water, energy and food.
Taken at face value, De Rivero’s message is depressing,
offering little hope for alleviation of poverty. However, there
are many who might examine the same situations, yet reach far
different conclusions.
First, he focuses primarily on macro initiatives and formal
sector measures as vehicles for progress. The alternative of
small-scale initiatives in the informal sector is ignored.
Second, developing country data is often questionable, and
the choice of measurement can skew results. For example, in
addressing the challenge of producing enough food for growing
populations, De Rivero discusses the additional mouths that
must be fed each year by using a birth count, without adjustment for deaths. He speaks of urban migration as a factor contributing to water shortage because water consumed by people
in cities is not available for food production. Had the citizens
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not migrated, they would have consumed water in the rural
area, preventing its use for agriculture. The migration affects
agriculture only to the extent that city dwellers consume more
water than rural citizens. He presents UN data indicating that
real per capita income fell in seventy “so-called developing
countries” over the past 20 years as indication that development policies are not working. The UNDP’s Human
Development Report 2001 states that “Many more people can
enjoy a decent standard of living, with average incomes in
developing countries having almost doubled in real terms
between 1975 and 1998” (UNDP, 10).
Third, De Rivero tends toward sweeping generalizations
and gaps in logic that make arguments appear stronger than
they are. For example, the ability to consume is equated to
access to credit. De Rivero states that less than one-sixth of the
world population is “bankable,” or able to be offered an international credit card. The rest “have no access to international
credit and thus cannot take part in the globalization of consumption.” While credit cards do facilitate consumer spending,
they certainly are not essential to it. Many who do not have a
credit card regularly purchase imported consumer goods or
domestically produced output of transnational firms. Another
example is the statement that countries who can’t earn enough
from exports but have growing urban populations have “no
option but to sink further into debt.” Perhaps the most glaring
gap is the main fatalistic thrust of the book: that currently
poor countries need give up hope of development and settle for
survival. Centuries of history have shown ongoing change in
the leading economies of the world. Countries who are now far
from the most prosperous once were. There is no reason to
expect that leadership will now lose its dynamic nature.
Finally, some well-known development issues are not
addressed or are given insignificant coverage in the book.
Many of the omitted issues are ones that are controlled to a
significant degree through domestic rather than foreign means.
For example, education and investments in human capital are
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hardly mentioned. The impact of the regulatory and tax
environment on attraction of foreign investment funds is given
minor note. The impact of corruption and law enforcement on
the business environment is overlooked.
The Myth of Development is passionate and thoughtprovoking, but not entirely convincing.
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